Keeping the WTO from Becoming the World Trans-Science Organization: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute by Walker, Vern R.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 31
Issue 2 1998 Article 2
Keeping the WTO from Becoming the World
Trans-Science Organization: Scientific Uncertainty,
Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth
Hormones Dispute
Vern R. Walker
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walker, Vern R. (1998) "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the World Trans-Science Organization: Scientific Uncertainty, Science
Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol31/iss2/2
Keeping the WTO from Becoming the
"World Trans-science Organization":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science
Policy, and Factfinding in the
Growth Hormones Dispute
Vern R. Walker*
Introduction ..................................................... 252
I. Obligations of Members Under the SPS Agreement ........ 255
A. Scientific Uncertainty and Science Policy Within Risk
Assessm ent ........................................... 256
1. The Nature of Risk Assessment ...................... 256
2. The Elements of Risk Assessment .................... 263
a. Hazard Identification .......................... 263
b. Dose-Response Assessment .................... 264
c. Exposure Assessment .......................... 266
d. Risk Characterization .......................... 266
B. Risk Management ..................................... 267
1. Selecting a Level of Protection ...................... 268
2. Establishing Measures to Achieve the Selected Level of
Protection ......................................... 271
3. Accepting Alternative Measures as Equivalent ........ 272
C. Harmonizing Sanitary Measures Using International
Standards ............................................. 272
II. WTO Review of Sanitary Measures Established by
M em bers ................................................. 277
A. The Proper Substantive Issues Before a Panel .......... 278
1. Reviewing Risk Assessment Determinations .......... 279
2. Reviewing Risk Management Decisions .............. 285
B. The Evidence Available to a Panel ..................... 287
C. The Standard and Burden of Proof .................... 290
III. Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Proceeding ......... 296
A. The Proper Substantive Issues Before the Hormones
Panel ................................................. 296
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University. Ph.D., 1975, University of Notre Dame;
J.D., 1980, Yale University. The author served as a consultant to the European
Commission in the appeal of the panel reports in the growth hormones dispute
discussed in this Article, but the views expressed here are not necessarily those of the
European Communities.
31 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 251 (1998)
Cornell International Law Journal
1. Content of Findings on Risk Assessment
Determinations .................................... 296
2. Content of Findings on Risk Management
Determinations .................................... 305
B. The Evidence Properly Available to the Hormones Panel
........................................... 310
C. The Standard and Burden of Proof Employed by the
Panel ................................................. 311
C onclusion ...................................................... 319
Introduction
In the time since the scientist Alvin Weinberg first introduced the term
"trans-science,"1 we have come to view the interface between science and
regulation as part fact, part policy, and part decision-making. The factual
aspect derives from the scientific evidence, which makes some policies
more reasonable than others and some decisions more effective or more
efficient than others. The policy aspect is reflected in the determination to
base decisions upon the best available scientific evidence, but to bridge any
remaining gaps in our scientific knowledge with default inference rules
based on non-scientific considerations. The decisional aspect stems from
the responsibility of regulatory government to act expeditiously, often
despite the fact that our scientific knowledge of consequences is incom-
plete and our policies are vague and conflicting. In the last half of this
century, American administrative law has adjusted to the notion that
health, safety and environmental regulation is entrusted primarily to agen-
cies that operate at this fact-policy-decisional interface between science
and regulation.
With the advent of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments,2 and in particular the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
1. Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972) (defining
"trans-science" questions as "questions which can be asked of science and yet which
cannot be answered by science," although "they are, epistemologically speaking, questions
of fact .. "). See Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Admin-
istrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA,
67 GEO. LJ. 729, 732-47 (1979) (citing as a "perfect example of a trans-scientific issue"
the extrapolation from high-dose carcinogenic effects to low doses, and arguing that
science policy questions "lie on a spectrum that ranges from issues of pure scientific fact
to issues of pure policy."). In this Article, I do not rely on any particular set of subcat-
egories of trans-science or science policy issues. It is sufficient for my purposes to con-
trast science and science policy, see infra Part I, and to consider trans-science issues as
particularly compelling examples of determinations requiring the use of science
policies.
For general discussions of "trans-science," see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade
in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1618-28 (1995); David A. Wirth, The
Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L I.J.
817, 832-40 (1994); Giandomenico Majone, Science and Trans-Science in Standard Set-
ting, 9 Sci., TECH., & HuMAN VALUEs, Winter 1984, at 15.
2. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
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Measures (SPS Agreement), 3 the question is to what extent the United
States and other member states have ceded, or should cede, regulatory
authority at this same interface to the World Trade Organization (WTO).4
The SPS Agreement sets forth the rights and obligations of members with
respect to any measure taken by a member to protect the health or life of
humans, animals, or plants ("sanitary or phytosanitary measures") that
may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade. 5 On the one hand,
members have the sovereign right to take such measures to protect health
and life within their territories; on the other hand, they may do so only if
such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of the SPS Agree-
ment and, in particular, are not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory
and do not constitute disguised restrictions on international trade.6 If dis-
putes arise between WTO members concerning compliance with the SPS
Agreement, they are to be resolved through the process set up by the Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 7 The DSU established a Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO with authority to establish factfinding
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, and otherwise administer
the dispute settlement process of the WTO.8 Thus, WTO members agree
that, in disputes over whether a member's domestic regulatory measures
are inconsistent with the SPS Agreement, the DSB is the final arbiter.
The central strategy of the SPS Agreement is to use science to distin-
guish between those sanitary measures consistent with the Agreement and
those in violation of the Agreement. In essence, a sanitary measure that
adversely affects international trade is consistent with the SPS Agreement
only to the extent it is necessary to protect health or life, and provided it "is
based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient sci-
entific evidence." 9 Such measures must also be "based on" risk assessment
methods10 and must be undertaken pursuant to certain risk management
3. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosarlitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, annex 1A-4 to Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, in Message From the President of the United States Transmitting
the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of
Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1,
at 1381-95 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
4. The WTO was established during the 1994 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M.
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
5. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, preamble, art. 1.1, annex A.1.
6. Id. arts. 2.1, 2.3.
7. See Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes, 33 I.L.M. 1226, arts. 1.1, 23, app. 1 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]; WTO
Agreement, supra note 4, art. 4.3; SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 11.1. Unless other-
wise indicated, references in this Article to a "member" refer to membership under the
WTO Agreement, supra note 4, and the DSU, supra.
8. DSU, supra note 7, art. 2.1.
9. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2. Cf. Julie Cromer, Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures: What They Could Mean for Health and Safety Regulations Under GATT, 36
HALv. INArr' LJ. 557, 568 (1995) (stating that the SPS Agreement's purpose is "to ensure
that free trade continues regardless of technological differences or expectations as to
what is 'healthy' or 'safe'").
10. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 5.1-5.3.
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objectives and constraints. 1 Additionally, members hope to promote a
global harmonization of all such sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
with a central harmonizing role to be played by standards, guidelines, and
recommendations established by certain international institutions. 12
The interpretation of nearly all of these important provisions of the
SPS Agreement was at issue in a recent proceeding under the DSU. In
response to complaints by the United States and Canada against the Euro-
pean Communities, a WTO factfinding panel (the "Hormones Panel")
found that the European Communities violated the SPS Agreement by
maintaining and implementing measures that prohibit the marketing of
meat from farm animals treated with certain hormones for the purpose of
increasing feed efficiency and the animal's rate of growth ("growth promo-
tion" purposes).13 The primary European justification for these measures
was that the hormones are carcinogenic 14 and that growth promotional use
adds to the risk already faced by consumers from background levels of
hormones. 15 The European Communities appealed the adverse reports of
the WTO Hormones Panel, and the Appellate Body issued a single report
on January 16, 1998.16 The DSB adopted the Appellate Body report, as
well as the Panel reports as modified by the Appellate Body.17
The growth hormones dispute is not only a difficult case of first
impression under the SPS Agreement, but it also involves legal issues about
the interface between science and regulation. Moreover, it presents these
issues in a critical international context.' 8 One way of posing these issues
11. See id. arts. 5.3-5.6.
12. Id. preamble, art. 3, annex A.3.
13. Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones) - Complaint by the United States, Aug. 18, 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA, available
in Westlaw, WTO-DEC file, 1997 WL 569984 [hereinafter Hormones Panel Report
(US)]. On April 25, 1996, the United States requested the DSB to establish a factfinding
panel. Hormones Panel Report (US) 1 1.4. Report of the Panel, EC Measures Concern-
ing Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) - Complaint by Canada, Aug. 18, 1997, WT/
DS48/R/CAN, available in Westlaw, WTO-DEC file, 1997 WL 561677 [hereinafter Hor-
mones Panel Report (CAN)]. On September 27, 1996, Canada requested the DSB to
establish a panel. Hormones Panel Report (CAN) 11 1.3. Copies of both reports are
available on the Internet at World Trade Organization (visited Apr. 21, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org>.
The issues in the Canadian and U.S. proceedings were largely the same, and the two
reports are highly parallel in content. The Canadian report is the longer of the two (257
single-spaced pages, compared to the U.S. report of 225 pages). I have, therefore, relied
principally on the Canadian report for quotations, but have given citations to parallel
paragraphs in the U.S. report when it seemed helpful to do so.
14. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, a 3.6.
15. See, e.g., id. '1 8.192.
16. Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), Jan. 16, 1998, adopted Feb. 13, 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/
R, available in Westlaw, WTO-DEC file, 1998 WL 25520 [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report].
17. See Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (visited Apr. 21, 1998) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm>.
18. Wirth states that the "serious disagreement between the United States and the
European Union over hormone-treated beef, now [in 1994] nearly a decade in duration,
motivated much of [the SPS] text." Wirth, supra note 1, at 824.
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is to ask whether the WTO should become, or must become, the "World
Trans-science Organization," a global meta-regulator. In such a capacity,
the WTO would resolve scientific issues such as carcinogenicity, adopt pol-
icies concerning the acceptable levels of risk or scientific uncertainty, or
would make decisions about appropriate levels of health and safety. I
argue in this Article that the WTO has no authority under the SPS Agree-
ment to do any of these things. But this, in a sense, is not the difficult part
of the argument. The difficult task is to identify the precise role of the
WTO at the fact-policy-decisional interface between science and regulation,
such that the WTO can legitimately and usefully settle trade disputes like
the growth hormones dispute without becoming the World Trans-science
Organization. This Article presents an affirmative theory of the WTO's
proper role in such disputes.
In Part I of the Article, I analyze the relevant provisions of the SPS
Agreement. In that context, I examine the distinction between risk assess-
ment and risk management, as well as the concepts of scientific uncer-
tainty and science policy. Part II sets forth my proposal for how the WTO
should review the sanitary measures established by members. The focus of
attention is the factfinding process in dispute settlement proceedings and,
in particular, the substantive issues that should come before a panel, the
evidence that a panel should consider, and the proper standard and bur-
dens of proof. Finally, in Part III, I analyze the reports of the Hormones
Panel and argue that the Panel made numerous and serious errors of law. I
also argue that the Appellate Body, while it clarified a number of issues,
also left many important questions unresolved. I conclude by suggesting
the proper role of the WTO in factfinding about the regulatory programs of
WTO members.
I. Obligations of Members Under the SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement recognizes the sovereign right of every member to pro-
tect human, animal, or plant life and health within its territory, 19 and
addresses two distinct aspects of a risk-centered process for providing such
protection. First, a member is expected to engage in risk assessment. The
goals of risk assessment are to determine the adverse effects on human
health that can be caused by exposure to a toxic agent, and to determine
the potential for such exposure and adverse effects to occur.20 Second, a
member may undertake risk management: "the process of identifying, eval-
uating, selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk."21 Risk man-
19. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, preamble, arts. 1.1, 2.1, annex A.l. Although the
SPS Agreement applies to measures designed to protect the health or life of plants, ani-
mals, or humans, this Article will focus on the Agreement's protection of human life or
health. The adoption of this shortened form is partly for rhetorical convenience, and
partly because the WTO hormones dispute discussed here addressed almost exclusively
the effects on humans. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.22.
20. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 5.1-5.3, annex A.4.
21. The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Man-
agement, 1 FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RIsK MANAGEMENT 1 (1997). The
National Research Council used the term "risk management":
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agement involves the determination and application of an "acceptable level
of risk" - that is, "the level of protection deemed appropriate by the mem-
ber."22 The SPS Agreement sets forth certain requirements or disciplines
for this process of assessing and managing risk. The Agreement also
attempts to harmonize members' risk assessment and risk management
decisions, insofar as doing so is consistent with a respect for sovereignty.
The SPS Agreement therefore attempts to resolve the natural tension
between the trade efficiencies of harmonization and the respect for sover-
eign protection of health, and it seeks to do so by appealing to "neutral"
science. This part of the Article explores the roles of scientific uncertainty
and science policy in risk assessment, and their relevance to the balance
struck by the SPS Agreement between trade efficiencies and sovereign
rights.
A. Scientific Uncertainty and Science Policy Within Risk Assessment
1. The Nature of Risk Assessment
Risk assessment involves a scientific determination of the relationships
between causes and effects. It is generally agreed that total risk is a func-
tion of at least two factors: the toxicity of the agent and the predicted expo-
sure to that agent.23 Although exact terminology and lines of demarcation
may differ, a risk assessment involves making scientific determinations in
up to four distinct subcategories: 24
to describe the process of evaluating alternative regulatory actions and selecting
among them. Risk management, which is carried out by regulatory agencies
under various legislative mandates, is an agency decision-making process that
entails consideration of political, social, economic, and engineering information
with risk-related information to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory
options and to select the appropriate regulatory response to a potential chronic
health hazard. The selection process necessarily requires the use of value judg-
ments on such issues as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the
costs of control.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING
THE PRocESS 18-19 (1983) [hereinafter NRC (1983)]. Taking action to reduce risk is the
recognized right of all members. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.1.
22. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.5.
23. See, e.g., the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and
Risk Management, supra note 21, at 1.
24. See generally NRC (1983), supra note 21; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE
AND JUDGMENT IN RISK AsSESSMENT (1994) [hereinafter NRC (1994)]; Commission Direc-
tive 93/67/EEC of 20July 1993, L227 OFRC.J. OF THE EUR. COMMUN. 9 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Colnmission Directive] ("laying down the principles for assessment of risks to man
and the environment of substances notified in accordance with Council Directive 67/
548/EEC"); Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Application of Risk
Analysis to Food Standards Issues, Geneva, Switzerland, Mar. 13-17, 1995 [hereinafter
FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Risk Analysis]; Codex Alimentarius Commission,
Report of the Twenty-Second Session, Geneva, June 23-28, 1997, Agenda Item 6, Appen-
dix II (adopting definitions of risk analysis terminology).
Not every risk assessment needs to encompass all four subcategories, NRC (1994),
supra, at 27, but only "as appropriate to the circumstances," SPS Agreement, supra note
3, art. 5.1. The SPS Agreement does not specify the elements of a risk assessment in
detail. See id. arts. 5.1-5.2, annex A.4. Although Article 5.1 of the Agreement directs
members to take into account risk assessment techniques developed by relevant interna-
tional organizations, the Hormones Panel found that, with regard to its proceeding, the
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* Hazard Identification - identifying which environmental agents are capa-
ble of causing adverse health effects, as well as the types of adverse health
effects those agents can cause;25
* Dose-Response Assessment, or Hazard Characterization - evaluating the
quantitative and qualitative aspects of the causal relationship between
dose or level of exposure and the incidence or severity of the adverse
health effects;26
* Exposure Assessment - evaluating the probability, magnitude, duration,
and timing of the doses that people might receive as the result of the vari-
ous pathways of exposure to the agent;27 and
* Risk Characterization - integrating information on hazard identification,
dose-response assessment, and exposure assessment to develop a qualita-
tive or quantitative estimate of the total risk of adverse health effects to a
given population. 28
Each of these four elements will be examined in more detail below. Before
doing so, however, it is necessary to develop the central concepts of scien-
tific uncertainty and science policy.
The extent of the risk assessment required by the SPS Agreement in
any particular case depends upon the circumstances, 2 9 including the
nature and adequacy of the scientific information that is available. As long
as any sanitary measure "is based on scientific principles" 30 and "is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence," 3 ' and as long as the
risk assessment on which that measure is based has taken into account the
available information about toxicity and exposure,3 2 then the minimal
requirements of the SPS Agreement are satisfied.
parties agreed that no particular techniques had to be taken into account. Hormones
Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, TI 8.106, 8.113.
25. NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 19, 20-23; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 26, 57-
60.
26. NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 19-20, 23-27; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 26,
60-66; Commission Directive, supra note 24.
27. NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 20, 27-28; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 26-27,
43-55; Commission Directive, supra note 24.
28. NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 20; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 27, 68-78;
Commission Directive, supra note 24.
29. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.1; supra note 24. Moreover, the member
that relies on a risk assessment need not have conducted either that assessment or the
scientific studies that are taken into account in making that assessment. See Appellate
Body Report, supra note 16, 1 190. This is a matter of common sense and efficiency, as
well as common practice. In many regulatory systems, the party seeking regulatory
approval may be required to conduct the necessary studies and submit them for govern-
mental review. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) and 40 C.F.R. Part 158 (1997) (estab-
lishing data requirements for pesticide registration); 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 342(a)(1)(C),
348 (1994) and 21 C.F.R. Part 171 (1997) (establishing data requirements for petitions
proposing issuance of a regulation allowing use of food additive).
The SPS Agreement treats a member's particular "provisions on... methods of risk
assessment" as sanitary measures to be evaluated under the Agreement. SPS Agreement,
supra note 3, annex A.1. For the requirements on sanitary measures, see discussion
infra Part I.B.
30. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2.
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 5.2.
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Many, if not most, risk assessments today involve scientific uncer-
tainty. Scientific uncertainty is due to a lack of knowledge, and therefore
reflects the potential for error inherent in scientific information. 33 In even
routine conclusions about causation, there are inherent uncertainties
resulting from the choice of the particular variables used to gather data, the
measurements taken, the samples drawn, the mathematical models used,
and the causal factors and relations posited. 34 The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) states that uncertainty in risk assessment can be
classified into three major categories: measurement uncertainty, uncer-
tainty associated with the use of scientific models (e.g., dose-response
models), and data gaps. 35 Alternatively, a simple distinction can be made
between uncertainty about which model to use and uncertainty about
which values to use as inputs to those models. 36 Regardless of which taxo-
nomic scheme we use for describing uncertainty, it is clear that scientific
uncertainty pervades the empirical sciences and virtually all current esti-
mates of risk.37 There is an inherent potential for error associated with the
validity or reliability of the available data, the predictive accuracy of the
mathematical models used, and the explanations about the causal mecha-
nisms at work.
In order to complete a risk assessment that adequately characterizes
such uncertainty, risk assessors usually evaluate the scientific plausibility
of alternative models or of alternative model inputs. Risk assessors may
discount some accounts as not based on scientific principles or as incon-
sistent with established scientific theories. It is the nature of scientific
uncertainty, however, that two or more alternative accounts will remain
within the realm of plausibility. 38 Moreover, it seems impossible at the
present time to provide a single test for judging whether a conclusion is
"scientifically plausible." Roughly speaking, a causal account can be said
to be scientifically plausible whenever it is supported by empirical data (as
33. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Memorandum: EPA Risk Char-
acterization Program, Mar. 21, 1995, available on the Internet at Environmental Protection
Agency (last visited Apr. 21, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/ordntrnt/ORD/spc/rccover.
htm>; EPA, Policy for Risk Characterization, Mar. 1995, available on the Internet at Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (last visited Apr. 21, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/ordntrnt/
ORD/spc/rcpolicy.htm>; EPA, Science Policy Council, Guidance for Risk Characteriza-
tion, Feb. 1995, available on the Internet at Environmental Protection Agency (last visited
Apr. 21, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/ordntrnt/ORD/spc/rcguide.htm>; NRC (1994),
supra note 24, at 28-29, 161-62; FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Risk Analysis, supra
note 24, at 11-13, 24-29; Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy
of Scientific Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L. REv. 567, 570-71 (1991); NRC
(1983), supra note 21, at 11-13.
34. Each of these types of uncertainty is discussed in Walker, supra note 33, at 574-
618.
35. Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 8-9.
36. See NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 11-12, 162-66; FAO/WHO Expert Consulta-
tion on Risk Analysis, supra note 24, at 12, 25.
37. See Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 19-20; Report of a Joint
FAO/WHO Consultation, Risk Management and Food Safety, Rome, Italy, January 27-31,
1997, at 8 [hereinafter FAO/WHO Consultation on Risk Management]; Walker, supra
note 33, at 572-73, 625-26.
38. See, e.g., NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 28-37.
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opposed to mere speculation or personal intuition) and by a line of reason-
ing (often including a model and theory), which together provide a rational
basis for drawing a conclusion, even though reasonable scientists might
disagree on whether that conclusion is the only inference that can be
drawn validly from the data.3 9 Thus, there can be several scientifically
plausible conclusions or accounts, with wide disagreement among scien-
tists as to which conclusions or accounts will ultimately prove to be cor-
rect.40  As indirect evidence, therefore, the existence of good-faith
disagreement among respected scientists is itself a good indication that the
alternative accounts are scientifically plausible.
In the presence of such scientific uncertainty, risk assessment often
proceeds by choosing from among the alternative accounts that remain sci-
entifically plausible once all of the available scientific information has been
considered. The following part of this Article will illustrate that such
uncertainties are both numerous and inherent in scientific judgments
under each of the four elements of risk assessment. Faced with the reality
of limited knowledge, "assessors must [in many cases] choose among avail-
able data, models or assumptions in estimating risks."4 1 When science
does not provide a definitive answer as to which data, models or assump-
tions should be used, EPA encourages risk assessors to follow guidance
from the Agency's "science policy" in conducting risk assessments. 42 An
39. This formulation is necessarily broad and programmatic, because details
depend upon the particular area of research, the particular sciences involved, and the
current state of scientific information. For a discussion of plausible accounts in the area
of carcinogenicity, see infra Part I.A.2.
40. See NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 36.
41. Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 4-11.
42. "Science policies" are determinations about how risk assessors should proceed
when they encounter uncertainties involving multiple plausible accounts. Because such
policies usually specify which assumptions to use to bridge gaps in our scientific knowl-
edge, they are sometimes called "inference guidelines" or "default assumptions." See
NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 28-37; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 27, 85-90. As EPA
has stated:
The National Research Council, in its 1983 report ... recognized that default
assumptions are necessarily made in risk assessments where gaps exist in gen-
eral knowledge or in available data for a particular agent: These default assump-
tions are inferences based on general scientific knowledge of the phenomena in
question and are also matters of policy concerning the appropriate way to
bridge uncertainties that concern potential risk to human health ... from the
agent under assessment.
Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,964 (proposed Apr.
23, 1996) [hereinafter Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines]. See FAO/WHO Expert
Consultation on Risk Analysis, supra note 24, at 11-13, 24-29 (Risk assessment "requires
explicit recognition of uncertainties and, when appropriate, acknowledgement that alter-
native interpretations of the available data may be scientifically plausible."). Cf. Wein-
berg, supra note 1, at 215-16, 220 (stating that important contribution of scientists is "to
say where science ends and trans-science begins").
EPA and other authorities have expressly recognized the role of science policy in con-
ducting risk assessment. As EPA stated:
[w]ithin the Risk Assessment category there is a group that develops chemical-
specific risk assessments by collecting, analyzing, and synthesizing scientific
data to produce the hazard identification, dose-response, and exposure assess-
ment portion of the risk assessment and to characterize risk. This group relies
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example of a science policy is the presumption that a chemical agent that
can cause cancer in laboratory animals can also cause cancer in humans.
Numerous examples of such science policies are given in the following part
of this Article. EPA has issued several risk assessment guidelines that iden-
tify the science policies (and resulting "inference guidelines" or "default
assumptions") to be used by Agency risk assessors.43 It is also explicit EPA
policy that the risk characterization step of a risk assessment should
include a full discussion of the scientific uncertainties underlying all of the
steps of the risk assessment, and that the risk characterization should iden-
tify the science policies or guidelines used in making the assessment.44
Science policies themselves are not justified on purely scientific
grounds. In fact, the need for science policy arises precisely because our
limited scientific knowledge permits multiple accounts that are scientifi-
cally plausible. The pragmatic goal of risk assessment is to characterize
faithfully the current state of scientific knowledge, and to do so in a man-
ner and in a time frame that is useful for risk management decision-mak-
ing.45 Therefore, while risk assessment should be as purely scientific and
as free of policy as possible, the state of scientific knowledge in a given
in part on Agency risk assessment guidelines to address science policy issues
and scientific uncertainties.
Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 1. The National Research Council,
in its foundational 1983 report on risk assessment in the Federal Government, stated
that: "[tihe choices encountered in risk assessment rest, to various degrees, on a mix-
ture of scientific fact and consensus, on informed scientific judgment, and on policy
determinations (the appropriate degree of conservatism)." NRC, supra note 21, at 36.
In a subsequent report, the National Research Council stated that:
[ilike the committee that produced the 1983 NRC report, we recognize that there
is an inevitable interplay between risk assessment and risk management. As the
1983 report states (pp. 76, 81), "risk assessment must always include policy, as
well as science," and "guidelines must include both scientific knowledge and
policy judgments." Any choice of defaults, or the decision not to have defaults
at all, therefore amounts to a policy decision.
NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 87.
43. For example, in the area of risk assessment for carcinogenicity, the EPA has pub-
lished Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992 (1986), has pro-
posed revised guidelines, and has stated that "[bloth the 1986 guidelines and the
current [19961 proposal contain inference guidance in the form of default inferences to
bridge gaps in knowledge and data." Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note
42, at 17,960. On the terminology of "inference guidelines" or "default assumptions,"
see supra note 42.
44. See Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33. EPA stated that:
This section focuses on two requirements for full characterization of risk. ...
Second, [the risk characterization] should identify the important strengths and
uncertainties in the assessment as part of a discussion of the confidence in the
assessment.
A discussion of uncertainty requires comment on such issues as the quality and
quantity of available data, gaps in the data base for specific chemicals, quality of
the measured data, use of default assumptions, incomplete understanding of
general biological phenomena, and scientific judgments or science policy posi-
tions that were employed to bridge information gaps.
Id. at 4-5.
45. See Memorandum: EPA Risk Characterization Program, supra note 33; Policy for
Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 1-3.
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area is often so limited that risk assessors are forced to choose among alter-
native models or inputs by following rules that take into account consider-
ations other than science.46 These rules are science policies. For example,
in the face of scientific uncertainty, it is common to select models or model
inputs that analysts consider to be conservative in protecting human
health, although the decision to protect human health is not a canon of
pure science.47 So while risk assessors who arrive at a risk characteriza-
tion in the face of scientific uncertainty should be guided by science poli-
cies, those policies are not themselves scientific in nature and are not
created by risk assessors alone. Rather, they are policies that reflect the
broader goals of risk regulation, such as protecting human health.
Explicit science policies or inference guidelines allow risk assessments
to remain "objective" by maintaining consistency and transparency in the
face of scientific uncertainty, even though some risk management goals are
used to provide guidance to risk assessors about how to proceed.48 We are
able to maintain a functional distinction between risk assessment and risk
management precisely because the former is limited to drawing inferences
supported by science alone, or by science combined with explicit science
policies or inference guidelines. 49
EPA recognizes that while risk assessors should follow science policy
guidelines when choosing among scientifically plausible alternatives and
when reporting underlying uncertainties within the risk characterization,
46. See supra note 42. The central purpose of science policies is to bridge gaps in
current scientific knowledge. Therefore, when there is an advance in scientific knowl-
edge that fills a particular gap, the policy should be replaced by that knowledge. Until
that time comes, however, science-policy choices made by risk assessors should always
be choices from among scientifically plausible alternatives, and each alternative must
have a reasonable scientific basis in order to be considered scientifically plausible.
47. See Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 1-10.
48. See Memorandum: EPA Risk Characterization Program, supra note 33, at 2. EPA
stated that:
[B]ecause transparency in decisionmaking and clarity in communication will
likely lead to more outside questioning of our assumptions and science policies,
we must be more vigilant about ensuring that our core assumptions and science
policies are consistent and comparable across programs, well grounded in sci-
ence, and that they fall within a "zone of reasonableness."
Id.
As stated by a Joint FAO/WHO Consultation: "Risk assessment policy setting is a risk
management responsibility, which should be carried out in full collaboration with risk
assessors, and which serves to protect the scientific integrity of the risk assessment. The
guidelines should be documented so as to ensure consistency and transparency." FAO/
WHO Consultation on Risk Management, supra note 37, at 5.
49. The alternatives from which science-policy choices are made should qualify as
candidates solely on the basis of scientific principles, even though the choices them-
selves are guided by risk management objectives. Thus, risk management and risk
assessment necessarily interact, see NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 87, in what should be
transparent and precise ways, while they also maintain distinct roles. See Guidance for
Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 2 ("Risk assessors and risk managers should be
sensitive to distinctions between risk assessment and risk management .... Where
responsibilities differ, it is important that participants confine themselves to tasks in
their areas of responsibility and not inadvertently obscure differences between risk
assessment and risk management.").
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they should not take on the role properly reserved for risk managers. 5 0 For
example, in selecting, evaluating, and presenting scientific information,
risk assessors should not consider issues such as cost or feasibility or how
the scientific analysis might influence the regulatory decision. 5 1 Addition-
ally, risk assessors are not to "make decisions on the acceptability of any
risk level for protecting public health or selecting procedures for reducing
risks."5 2 EPA states that: "[miatters such as risk assessment priorities,
degree of conservatism, and acceptability of particular risk levels are
reserved for decision-makers who are charged with making decisions
regarding protection of public health."53 Such management decision-mak-
ing is reserved for legislatures or governmental officials charged with pro-
tecting public health. It falls to risk management to balance competing
societal goals (including costs and benefits) and to take science, scientific
uncertainty, and risk characterization into account in setting generic sci-
ence policies and in arriving at specific decisions about risk acceptance or
reduction.5 4
According to the United States, the SPS Agreement "recognizes the fact
that scientific certainty is rare and many scientific determinations require
judgments between differing scientific views. The [SPS] Agreement pre-
serves the ability of governments to make such judgments."55 All scientifi-
cally plausible alternatives have, by definition, a reasonable scientific basis
and, to use the phrasing of the SPS Agreement, are "based on scientific
principles," have "sufficient scientific evidence," and "take into account
available scientific evidence."5 6 On the other hand, any of several scientifi-
cally plausible alternatives might eventually prove to be the correct
account. Therefore, the SPS Agreement requires a risk determination
based on scientifically plausible models and model inputs, but does not
pretend that scientific evidence can always, or even often, prove which plau-
sible alternative is the correct one.
50. See Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 2-3; cf. FAO/WHO Con-
sultation on Risk Management, supra note 37, at 5-6, 15 (recommending that determina-
tion of "risk assessment policy" should be "a specific component of risk management,"
and that a "functional separation" should be maintained between risk management and
risk assessment).
51. Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. EPA stated that:
[r]isk managers, as a separate category [from risk assessors], integrate the risk
characterization with other considerations specified in applicable statutes to
make and justify regulatory decisions.
For example, a regulatory decision on the use of a particular pesticide considers
not only the risk level to affected populations, but also the agricultural benefits
of its use that may be important for the nation's food supply.
Id. at 2, 3.
55. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, Agree-
ment on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures § 6.b, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4102, 4105.
56. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 2.2, 5.2.
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Setting science policy, which specifies how to deal with scientific
uncertainty within risk assessments, is itself a function of risk manage-
ment. The SPS Agreement leaves room for members to choose different
science policies. A given member, therefore, might disagree with the risk
conclusions drawn by a study's scientific author, by the authors of a risk
assessment report based on the study, or by another member considering
the same data, and the SPS Agreement would not be violated so long as
these disagreements are rooted in scientific principles. Whenever scientific
uncertainty is present in risk assessment, each member should be entitled
to choose between scientifically plausible options and should be able to
follow its own science policies, which reflect in turn that member's man-
agement policies. The only alternative would be to require members to
adopt a set of WTO science policies.57
2. The Elements of Risk Assessment
Science policy determinations pervade risk assessment and are essential to
completing most risk assessments. This point, which must be fully appre-
ciated in order to interpret the SPS Agreement in a workable way, can be
illustrated by a brief survey of EPA's position on this issue in the context of
agency risk assessments for carcinogens. 58
a. Hazard Identification
The determination that a chemical agent is carcinogenic to humans usually
involves many choices among scientifically plausible options. An impor-
tant example is the appropriate weight to be placed on carcinogenicity data
from studies of laboratory animals. EPA recognizes the following major
default assumptions in its inferences from animal data to conclusions
about the carcinogenicity of an agent in humans: that positive effects in
animal cancer studies indicate carcinogenic potential in humans; that
effects seen in animals at the highest dose tested (the maximum tolerated
dose) are appropriate to use in carcinogenicity assessment; that concor-
dance among target organs of carcinogenicity is not a prerequisite; that
benign tumors observed in the animal studies should be included in
assessing animal tumor incidence if the tumors have the capacity to pro-
gress to malignancies; that there is a similarity of the basic pathways of
metabolism that are relevant to species-to-species extrapolation of cancer
hazard; and that a human dose that is equivalent to an animal dose can be
57. Imagine, for example, that WTO dispute settlement panels were to rank compet-
ing but scientifically plausible alternatives on a scale ranging from "merely plausible" to
"highly plausible." A panel finding that certain measures were based on "merely plausi-
ble" theories would find those measures to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. It
would be hard to find a source of legal authority for such an undertaking. Moreover,
there is no scientific consensus on a general method for performing such ranking, and it
is currently implausible that such ranking could be scientifically demonstrated to be
correct. If WTO panels were to begin finding some scientifically plausible options to be
unacceptable bases under the SPS Agreement, then this would be an example of impos-
ing a WTO science policy upon members.
58. See generally EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, supra note 43; Pro-
posed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 42.
Cornell International Law Journal
estimated by using a scaling factor based on body weight (in the case of
oral exposure), default estimates of lung deposition and of internal dose
(for inhalation exposure), or internal dose (for a route-to-route of exposure
extrapolation). 59 Unless such default rules were used to bridge large gaps
in fundamental knowledge or smaller gaps in agent-specific knowledge,
hazard identification and risk assessment could not be completed. 60 On
occasion, such default assumptions have been incorporated into statutes,
as in the case of the Delaney Clause governing approval of food additives
under the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which treats as
human carcinogens any food additives that can cause cancer in laboratory
animals.6 1
b. Dose-Response Assessment
If a chemical agent is capable of causing an adverse health effect in humans
at some dose, then it is important to determine the conditions under which
that adverse effect can occur, and what the relevant dose or level of expo-
sure is. For example, EPA recognizes the following major default assump-
tions in its inferences from animal data at high doses to conclusions about
the expected carcinogenic response of humans at low doses: a biologically
59. Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 42, at 17,967-68.
60. See id. at 17,964-66 ("[Tlhe major default assumptions commonly employed in
cancer risk assessment and adopted in these guidelines" are "predominantly inferences
necessary to use data observed under empirical conditions to estimate events and out-
comes under environmental conditions.").
61. 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1998). The statute provides that: "no
additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man
or animal" (emphasis added). As the U.S. Government stated:
The determination that a particular substance poses a risk of cancer is a scien-
tific determination, based on an evaluation of the potential for a substance to
induce cancer. Based on scientific principles, the United States has determined
that if a substance induces cancer in animals, it poses some risk of human
carcinogenesis.
Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 54, § 9.
SeeJeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 Nw. J. Irr'L L. &
Bus. 736, 744-45 (1996-97) (stating that SPS Agreement grants "nearly complete discre-
tion to legislatures to enact SPS measures where risk assessment has been performed"
and that a risk assessment might prove "adequate ... for purposes of staving off a trade
challenge" if the assessment takes notice that "a substance has been shown, to any
degree, to cause cancer in laboratory animals"); Zane 0. Gresham & Thomas A. Bloom-
field, Rhetoric or Reality: The Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Federal and
State Environmental Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1143, 1148-50 (1995) (stating that a
decision to adopt "zero-risk tolerance," such as the U.S. Delaney Clause, is not subject to
challenge under the SPS Agreement and that U.S. regulations "are based upon a political
choice of what level of risk is appropriate and a scientific determination regarding
whether the risk exists"); Robert M. Millimet, The Impact of the Uruguay Round and the
New Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: An Analysis of the U.S. Ban on
DDT, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONT-MP. PROBs. 449, 473 (1995) (arguing that the Delaney
Clause is sufficiently premised on science to satisfy the SPS Agreement because it was
enacted after scientific testimony that the then-current techniques were incapable of
determining a safe level of carcinogens, and because the clause is triggered only by
positive data showing carcinogenicity in animals). But seeJeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional
Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ and Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MIcHx. J. Irr'L L. 1043,
1076-77 (1994) (stating that Delaney Clauses rest "on the political - rather than scien-
tific - judgment that no risk posed by carcinogens in the food supply is acceptable").
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based or case-specific model is preferred for extrapolating below the range
of observed data, but a curve-fitting model is to be used in the absence of
such models; if a curve-fitting model is used and evidence on the mode of
action is not sufficient to infer a threshold of action, then the default
approach is to assume that carcinogenic response is linearly related to dose
from the lowest observed data down to zero dose/zero response; and, if a
curve-fitting model is used but there is sufficient evidence to infer a thresh-
old of action, then the margin of exposure is calculated by dividing the low-
dose-response point within the range of observation by the environmental
exposure of interest.62 Without such assumptions - whether made in
accordance with formally adopted science policies or ad-hoc by individual
scientists - dose-response assessments for carcinogenicity could not be
completed.
An especially critical regulatory task is to determine the shape of the
dose-response curve at the low doses typical of many human exposures.
For non-carcinogenic effects, regulators try to determine whether there is a
"no-effect threshold" specific to the agent and the adverse effect - that is, a
dose or exposure level below which the adverse effect does not occur and
above which it can occur. 63 The question is whether there is a "safe" level
of exposure below which there is no risk of adverse effect. If the agent is
carcinogenic, however, there are often plausible scientific grounds for act-
ing as though no threshold exists or for inferring that, if it exists, it is very
low and cannot be identified reliably.6 4 Especially when the causal mecha-
nism for cancer is unclear or the agent is genotoxic, the traditional regula-
tory approach has been to treat carcinogens as not having a no-effect
threshold.65 Such carcinogens are treated as though any level of exposure
poses some positive risk.
In extrapola.ting from high-dose effects to low-dose effects, from labo-
ratory animals to humans, and from healthy individuals to more sensitive
individuals, many choices have to be made among scientifically plausible
options. Uncertainties arise repeatedly along the chains of inference, and
science policies are adopted to guide the choices of scientists performing
risk assessment. The numerous examples given above were adopted by
EPA as a matter of Agency policy. Sometimes those choices are made by
legislative institutions. For example, one Congressional science policy is
62. Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 42, at 17,968-69, 17,992-96.
The EPA considers the choice of the appropriate margin of exposure to employ in regula-
tion to be a question of risk management, not risk assessment. Id. at 17,969, 17,993. A
typical and traditional margin of exposure might be 100 - a factor of 10 to make a
conservative allowance for extrapolating from animals to humans, and an additional
factor of 10 to allow for variability in response among human beings. Id. As EPA points
out, these "10-fold factors are moderately conservative, traditional ones used for decades
in the assessment of toxicological effects." Id. at 17,969. See NRC (1994), supra note
24, at 30-31.
63. NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 28-31.
64. See, e.g., Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 42, at 17,968-69,
17,992-93; NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 29-31, 65-66, 85-90.
65. See infra note 66; Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assessment in the Federal Govern-
ment: Trying to Understand the Process, 5 TUL. Evmn.. LJ. 45, 62-67 (1991).
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the Delaney Clause that prohibits the use of food additives that cause can-
cer in laboratory animals.66 Whether those choices are made in statutes or
regulations, or whether they are made in the form of generic guidelines for
all decisions or on a purely ad-hoc and case-specific basis, they are essen-
tial to completing dose-response assessment.
c. Exposure Assessment
As noted above, risk is a function not only of the toxicity of the agent, but
also of the likelihood that a dose will be received and the likely magnitude
of that dose. The SPS Agreement acknowledges this need to determine
exposure by requiring members to take into account "relevant processes
and production methods" for products that might contain toxins, as well as
"relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods" for those products. 67
In predicting the magnitude, duration, and frequency of exposure in actual
populations, agencies such as EPA often have to make assumptions to
bridge gaps in available input data.68 They also have to adopt models for
predicting the environmental fate of chemicals in air, water, and soil.69
Science policy, therefore, can play as essential a role in exposure assess-
ment as it does in toxicity assessment.
d. Risk Characterization
The objectives in risk characterization are to summarize the primary con-
clusions about hazard, dose-response, and exposure, to integrate those con-
clusions into an assessment of risk, and to present the integrated risk
information in a form useful to decision-makers and risk managers. 70 EPA
has been careful to emphasize that risk characterizations should also
describe "the constraints of available data and the state of knowledge, sig-
nificant scientific issues, and significant science and science policy choices
that were made when alternative interpretations of data existed. '71 Unless
66. 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1998). The U.S. Government stated
that: "Based on scientific principles, the United States has determined that if a sub-
stance induces cancer in animals, it poses some risk of human carcinogenesis. And
since the level of protection under Delaney requires that there be zero risk of carcinogen-
esis, the United States prohibits the substance." Statement of Administrative Action,
supra note 55, § 9. As the National Research Council stated, the Delaney Clause is
"[p]erhaps the earliest legislative acknowledgement of the possibility that chemical car-
cinogens might act in the same way" as radiation-induced cancer - that is, through
nonthreshold mechanisms, such that "exposure to even one molecule of a carcinogen is
associated with a small but non-zero increased risk of tumor induction." NRC (1994),
supra note 24, at 31.
67. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.2. As the Appellate Body stated:
[Tihe risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under [SPS] Article 5.1 is
not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly con-
trolled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in
other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
world where people live and work and die.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 187.
68. See EPA, Guidelines for Exposure Assessment, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,888, 22,909-17,
22,926-29 (1992).
69. Id.
70. See Policy for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 3-4.
71. Proposed EPA Carcinogen Guidelines, supra note 42, at 17,999-18,000.
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a risk characterization acknowledges that "[r]isk assessment is an iterative
process" and that "[djefault assumptions are used at every stage because
no database is ever complete," then risk assessment as a process is less
likely to achieve its goals of "transparency in environmental decisionmak-
ing, clarity in communication, consistency in core assumptions and sci-
ence policies from case to case, and reasonableness. '72 Every risk
assessment of a potentially carcinogenic agent contains a great number of
scientific uncertainties and default assumptions. These aspects would
remain invisible to risk managers unless brought to the surface and
explained. Risk assessment cannot remain true to its scientific ideals
unless it also discloses the limitations of the science it contains. As the
Greek founders of Western science emphasized, an essential aspect of true
scientific knowledge is knowing what it is that we do not know. 73
B. Risk Management
Risk management is "the process of identifying, evaluating, selecting, and
implementing actions to reduce risk to human health."74 Risk managers
decide what, if anything, to do about risk, by employing: (1) the results of
risk assessment; (2) scientific information about the costs, benefits, and
causal consequences of management choices; and (3) value judgments
about societal goals and objectives. 75 The resulting risk management deci-
sions balance such competing societal goals as taking a conservative
approach to protecting human health and maximizing the net benefits of
various forms of regulation. The" difficulties of striking an appropriate bal-
ance are compounded by considerations of technological, political, and
administrative feasibility, as well as by the inherent uncertainties in risk
assessment. Such risk management decisions should be made by those in
government who are charged with protecting public health,76 including
72. See id. at 17,999.
73. In Plato's Apology, Socrates states:
[sbo when I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man: neither of
us knows anything that is really worth knowing, but he thinks that he has
knowledge when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I
have. I seem, at any rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point: I do not
think that I know what I do not know."
PLATO, EuTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CmTo 26 (FJ. Church trans., Bobbs Merrill Educational
Publishing, 2d ed. 1956). Science policies should be formally adopted and risk assess-
ment scientists should be required to disclose and explain inherent scientific uncertain-
ties. In this way, those who make decisions based on a particular risk assessment will
understand the limits of the underlying scientific knowledge. Absent such disclosure
and explanation, decision-makers will not be able to distinguish guesswork from well-
supported findings. See supra notes 42, 48.
74. The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Man-
agement, supra note 21, at 1. See generally NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 18-19; FAO/
WHO Consultation on Risk Management, supra note 37.
75. As the National Research Council stated, risk management "entails considera-
tion of political, social, economic, and engineering information with risk-related infor-
mation to develop, analyze, and compare regulatory options and to select the
appropriate regulatory response." NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 19.
76. See EPA, Guidance for Risk Characterization, supra note 33, at 3 ("Matters such as
risk assessment priorities, degree of conservatism, and acceptability of particular risk
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national legislative bodies and administrative agencies. 77
The SPS Agreement recognizes at least three types of actions that a
member may take to manage risks, and sets certain minimal requirements
or disciplines for each. These three types of actions are:
(1) Selecting the level of protection deemed appropriate by the member;
(2) Establishing sanitary measures to achieve that level of protection; and
(3) Accepting measures established by other members as being equivalent
to its own.
Each of these functions will be discussed in turn.
1. Selecting a Level of Protection
The SPS Agreement defines the "appropriate level of protection" as that
level of protection "deemed appropriate by the member" to protect human
life or health within its territory.78 Selecting the appropriate level of pro-
tection is an act of sovereignty, and the Agreement does not require the
members to select any particular level. 7 9
The Agreement has only two provisions bearing on the selection of a
levels are reserved for decision-makers who are charged with making decisions regard-
ing protection of public health.").
77. The "precautionary principle" employed in international environmental law is
fundamentally a policy of risk management. A typical articulation of the precautionary
principle is:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of seri-
ous or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879.
For a survey of the various treaty articulations of the precautionary principle, see James
E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International
Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. Lj. 423, 431-38 (1995). The principle reflects the
same precautionary approach so familiar from domestic environmental programs. As a
policy of risk management, the precautionary principle is conservative in nature and
strongly favors the protection of human health and the environment whenever such a
goal must be balanced against considerations such as technological feasibility, economic
efficiency, and administrative feasibility. See, e.g., id. at 425, 448-50 & n.102. For a
brief discussion of the precautionary principle in the context of the SPS Agreement, see
Wirth, supra note 1, at 838-40. But the conservative and health-protective approach of
the precautionary principle can also function derivatively as a management goal in
adopting science policies. When science policy is being established for risk assessment
itself, the precautionary principle can guide risk assessors when they must make choices
among scientifically plausible alternatives in the face of scientific uncertainty.
For a discussion of the relevance of the precautionary principle to the SPS Agreement,
see Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11 120-25. As the Appellate Body stated:
a panel charged with determining, for instance, whether "sufficient scientific
evidence" exists to warrant the maintenance by a Member of a particular SPS
measure may, of course, and should, bear in mind that responsible, representa-
tive governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution
where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, damage to human health are
concerned.
Id. 124.
78. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.5.
79. Id. preamble.
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level of protection. First, the Agreement "encourages" 80 each member to
"take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects."8 1
This provision is merely hortatory. The same objective is achieved by
requiring that any adopted sanitary measures must not be "more trade-
restrictive" than reasonably necessary.8 2 Thus, with respect to minimizing
negative trade effects, the SPS Agreement places restrictions on the means
chosen to achieve a selected level of protection, rather than on the process
of selecting that level.
Second, the Agreement requires a member to be internally "consis-
tent" in selecting levels of protection, and to avoid any "arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable distinctions" in its levels of protection that would "result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. '8 3 This
consistency requirement depends, therefore, on the meaning of "arbitrary
or unjustifiable." The SPS Agreement recognizes that these concepts are
difficult to define, and establishes a standing Committee to work with
members to develop guidelines for implementing this provision.8 4 The dif-
ficulty of determining consistency among levels of protection involviing dif-
ferent substances, different adverse effects, and different products is
indicated by the example that appears in the Agreement: that "the excep-
tional character of human health risks to which people voluntarily expose
themselves" is a relevant factor in determining consistency.8 5 The United
States interprets this provision to mean that a member could "legitimately
establish a high level of protection for pesticide exposure even if it sets a
lower level of protection from the risks of cigarette smoking."8 6 This exam-
ple displays an appropriate recognition of the growing empirical data
showing that factors such as the "voluntariness" of risk are important in
predicting public reaction to that risk.8 7 The difficulty in determining con-
sistency derives from the sovereign and value-driven nature of the selection
process. We are often hard pressed to explain why an individual takes
some risks rather than others, or values some objectives more than others
- and hard pressed to justify calling some sets of decisions "consistent"
and other sets "inconsistent. s8 8 Evaluation of consistency at the individual
level is difficult, but the difficulty is compounded when we evaluate such
decisions at the societal level. Perhaps with the passage of time and the
80. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, § 9.
81. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.4.
82. See infra Part I.B.2.
83. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, § 9.
87. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281-83 (1987).
88. For the growing literature on comparative risk assessment and countervailing
risks, see, for example, RIsK vERsus RISK: TRAEoFFs IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE Eim-
RONmENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); David A. Wirth &
Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1857 (1995) (book review) (dis-
cussing conceptual difficulties with comparative risk assessment, especially in context
of scientific uncertainty). Comparative risk assessments pose the same need for science
policy as do single risk assessments, but encounter additional conceptual problems.
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decision of numerous cases under the DSU, standards will evolve for decid-
ing when different levels of protection are "arbitrary or unjustifiable." In
the near term, however, such determinations should perhaps be made only
in the most blatant and unexplainable cases.89
One factor that seems clearly relevant to selecting a level of protection
is the benefit to be gained from undertaking the associated risk.90 Deter-
mining the "acceptable level of risk" is at least a function of prudential
considerations under all of the circumstances, some of which we may be
able to quantify in a cost-benefit analysis. In U.S. law, for example, a Dela-
ney Clause prohibits the use of food additives found to induce cancer in
animals,91 but EPA is permitted to consider the benefits to be obtained
from the use of a particular carcinogenic pesticide in order to justify
allowing a residue of that pesticide in food.92 The levels of protection are
different, but that difference might be justifiable in terms of benefits.
The precise logical relationship of science policy to the selection of an
appropriate level of protection is difficult to describe. However, it does
seem reasonably clear that adopting policies to bridge scientific uncertain-
ties is closely related to this aspect of risk management. Adopting a con-
servative approach to risk assessment, for example, should be seen as
merely one aspect of selecting a high level of protection: being conserva-
tive in estimating risk is one aspect of selecting a highly protective manage-
ment policy.93 Moreover, the requirement of consistency between different
89. One of the intellectually elusive aspects of formulating the precautionary princi-
ple of international environmental law as a foundation of risk management is the diffi-
culty of prescribing, generically and in advance, precisely how the protection of human
health or the environment should be balanced against such considerations as economic
efficiency and political feasibility. The multifactorial nature of such decisions renders it
unlikely that in the near future there will be agreement on a single, adequate, and
informative formulation of the principle that is enforceable as international law. See
Hickey & Walker, supra note 77, at 424-26.
90. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(bb) (West Supp. 1998) (defining "unreasonable
adverse effects" for purposes of the U.S. pesticide statute).
91. 21 U.S.C.A. § 348(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1998). As the U.S. has stated: "The
Delaney clauses, in the first instance, establish a level of protection. They reflect a deci-
sion by the Congress that there should be no risk of cancer to humans from the sub-
stances those clauses cover. That decision is fully protected under the [SPS]
Agreement." Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, § 9.
92. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(D) (West Supp. 1998); 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 346a(b)(2)(B)(iii)(II) (West Supp. 1998).
93. Alternatively, adopting a conservative science policy could be seen as a means of
achieving a selected level of protection. However, it would be inappropriate to concep-
tualize science policies as "sanitary measures." First, doing so would subject science
policies themselves to the disciplines of the SPS Agreement reserved for sanitary meas-
ures. Among those disciplines are the requirements that measures be "based on" a risk
assessment, be "based on" scientific principles, and be "not maintained without suffi-
cient scientific evidence." SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 5.1, 2.2. But such require-
ments would be senseless and circular if applied to science policies. Second, although
the SPS Agreement lists "methods of risk assessment" as an example of a sanitary mea-
sure, SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.1, the word "methods" in that context
should be read as referring to procedures, such as testing protocols, and not to the infer-
ence rules for interpreting the results of those procedures. Therefore, although science
policies are clearly products of risk management (not merely of risk assessment), they
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levels of protection is also a very sensible requirement for science policies.
The adoption of science policies to be applied generically in risk assess-
ment, wherever the relevant type of scientific uncertainty arises, would also
make selecting a level of protection more transparent, and could assist in
the development of criteria for when differences are "arbitrary or unjustifi-
able." In other words, the decision by members to handle scientific uncer-
tainties through formally adopted science policies should assist in the
evolution of SPS standards for selecting consistent levels of protection. For
these reasons, we should regard the adoption of science policies as one
aspect of selecting a level of protection. To the extent that scientific uncer-
tainties exist and science policies are in play, the same deference that is
due to a member's selection of a level of protection should be given to the
member's selection of science policies to guide risk assessment.
2. Establishing Measures to Achieve the Selected Level of Protection
Although sovereign decisions to select an appropriate level of protection are
largely unreviewable under the SPS Agreement, the Agreement places cer-
tain requirements on sanitary measures adopted as means for achieving a
selected level of protection. First, a member should adopt "trade-restric-
tive" measures "only to the extent necessary" to achieve that member's
selected level of protection.94 This requirement has two aspects: effective-
ness and efficiency. The only acceptable justification for a measure that is
trade-restrictive is that it is reasonably effective in bringing about the
targeted level of protection.95 If a trade-restrictive measure does not in fact
help to protect, then it cannot be justified as a means of providing protec-
tion. In addition, any sanitary measure should be reasonably efficient in
bringing about that protection, in the sense of minimizing collateral effects
on international trade.96 A member may take effective measures to achieve
its level of protection, so long as there are no alternative means to achieve
the same level of protection that are "significantly less restrictive to
trade."9 7 The modifier "significantly less restrictive" suggests that de
minimis differences between the effects of alternative measures are of no
consequence to the SPS Agreement. A member is entitled to deference in
its choice of means within some reasonable range of effects.
Second, a member should ensure that any measure is "based on" a
risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances, is "based on" scientific
principles, and "is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."9 8
This second set of requirements is designed to ensure that a measure has a
are not themselves sanitary measures. Rather, they result from the sovereign function of
selecting an appropriate level of protection.
94. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 2.2, 5.6.
95. A measure that does not contribute to bringing about an objective could hardly
be considered necessary to that end. See WEBS-R'S THIR NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1510-11 (Unabridged) (1986) (defining "necessary" as
meaning "cannot be done without' and "absolutely required").
96. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.6.
97. Id. art. 5.6 n.3.
98. Id. arts. 5.1, 2.2.
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legitimate risk-reduction or risk-avoidance goal, and that the measure is
grounded on the type of risk assessment foundation discussed above. It
also reinforces the requirement of a reasonable cause-and-effect relation-
ship between the sanitary measure chosen as a means and the societal
objective defined in terms of a selected level of protection.
When these two requirements are considered together, we find
another point of interaction between risk assessment and risk manage-
ment, as well as another place to expect scientific uncertainty and the use
of science policy to bridge gaps in knowledge. Under the Agreement, alter-
native measures are to be evaluated in part on their effectiveness in bring-
ing about risk reduction.99 For toxic agents, this is usually achieved by
reducing or avoiding exposure to the agent, although occasionally toxicity
itself is reducible. 100 In effect, in any comparison of alternative measures,
we expect a risk assessment to be performed on each alternative and the
resulting risk characterizations to be compared. In this process, the scien-
tific uncertainties inherent in the risk assessments will be dealt with by
science policies, which in turn are guided by the management policies at
work in selecting an appropriate level of protection. The issue of how to
deal with scientific uncertainties when two or more risk characterizations
are to be compared may well give rise to additional science policies.
3. Accepting Alternative Measures as Equivalent
The SPS Agreement anticipates that different members might establish dif-
ferent sanitary measures. The Agreement respects the sovereign right of an
importing member to select its own level of protection. It also defers to
that member's choice of sanitary measures to achieve that level of protec-
tion, so long as the conditions stated in the previous part are met. The
Agreement requires an importing member to accept the measures of
another member as "equivalent" to its own measures - but only if "the
exporting member objectively demonstrates to the importing member that
its measures achieve the importing member's appropriate level of ... pro-
tection."10 1 Thus, the Agreement is consistent in its deference to the
importing member's cause-and-effect determinations when they are made
in the context of the member's protection of the health of its own popula-
tion. The SPS Agreement requires this deference so long as the importing
member's determinations are based on scientifically plausible accounts of
cause-and-effect.
C. Harmonizing Sanitary Measures Using International Standards
There is a difficult tension within the SPS Agreement between a respect for
the sovereign right of members to protect health and a desire to increase
trade efficiency through global harmonization of SPS measures. Moreover,
the existence of scientific uncertainty and the resulting need for science
99. See id. arts. 2.2, 5.1, 5.6.
100. Legislation or regulation that prohibits the use of a toxic agent reduces risk by
eliminating certain pathways of exposure. See, e.g., the Delaney Clause prohibition on
carcinogenic food additives, supra note 66 and accompanying text; see supra Part I.A.2.c.
101. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.1 (emphasis added).
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policy complicate the Agreement's attempt to rely upon science as a neu-
tral mediating principle. This part of the Article briefly examines the strat-
egy under the SPS Agreement to use international standards, where they
exist, to encourage but not impose harmonization.
The SPS Agreement does not mandate harmonization of all members'
levels of protection. In fact, as noted above, decisions to select levels of
protection are sovereign decisions that are accorded substantial deference
under the Agreement. 10 2 As discussed above in Part I.B, explicit SPS
requirements are imposed principally on the establishment of sanitary
measures as means of achieving the selected levels of protection. However,
the Agreement promotes "international standards, guidelines or recom-
mendations" as setting a minimum level of protection, while allowing mem-
bers to set and maintain higher levels of protection. 10 3 As the United
States has stated, the SPS Agreement "does not require 'downward harmo-
nization' to less stringent [SPS] measures," and "a government is not
required to accept international standards... that would result in a lower
level of protection than the government has determined to be appropri-
ate."'1 4 Instead, the SPS Agreement promotes harmonization by having
members choose one of three alternatives.
First, a member may choose to conform its sanitary measures to
existing international standards, guidelines, or recommendations.' 0 5 For
example, the SPS Agreement identifies the standards or guidelines estab-
lished by the Codex Alimentarius Commission as the relevant interna-
tional reference body for food safety.106 The Codex Commission
establishes "acceptable daily intakes" ("ADIs") for certain kinds of chemi-
cals in food, and also recommends "maximum residue limits" ("MRLs") for
certain kinds of residues in foods. 10 7 Where Codex has set an ADI and
102. See supra Part I.B.1. The SPS Agreement formulates the appropriate balance:
"Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures
between Members .... without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of
protection of human, animal or plant life or health ...." SPS Agreement, supra note 3,
preamble.
103. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 3.1-3.3.
104. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, § 7.
105. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.2.
106. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.3(a); Hormones Panel Report (CAN),
supra note 13, c1 8.62.
107. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, c 8.62. See generally FAQ/WHO
Consultation on Risk Management, supra note 37; FAQ/WHO Expert Consultation on
Risk Analysis, supra note 24.
Existing Codex standards reflect what Codex considers to be an acceptable level of
protection. See FAO/WHO Consultation on Risk Management, supra note 37, at 4. The
Joint Consultation stated:
[a]lithough industry and national regulators strive for production and processing
systems which ensure that all food be "safe and wholesome," complete freedom
from risks is an unattainable goal. Safety and wholesomeness are related to a
level of risk that society regards as reasonable in the context, and in comparison
with other risks in everyday life.
A Codex standard is the minimum standard for a food elaborated by [the Codex
Alimentarius Commission] "so as to ensure a sound, wholesome product. . ".
The word "minimum" does not have any pejorative connotations and simply
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recommended an MRL, a member could adopt the ADI and choose to
incorporate the MRL into its own domestic law as a legally permissible
residue level. The SPS Agreement encourages such actions. It provides
that a conforming sanitary measure would be "deemed to be necessary" for
purposes of article 2.2 and would be "presumed to be consistent with"
other relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement and of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). 108
Second, a member may choose to "base [its] sanitary.., measures on
international standards," instead of simply conforming to those stan-
dards. 10 9 For example, a member might adopt the ADI but adjust the MRL
to reflect dietary patterns peculiar to its population, or other considera-
tions involved in exposure assessment. Alternatively, a member might
adopt the level of protection implicit in the ADI but establish a measure
means the level of quality and soundness of a product judged by consensus to
be appropriate for trade internationally and nationally.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also id. at 8 (enumerating examples of
"risk assessment policies" employed by scientific advisory groups relied upon by
Codex).
As the Hormones Panel noted, an ADI is an estimate of the amount of a veterinary
drug "that can be ingested daily over a lifetime without appreciable health risk." Hor-
mones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, c 2.17, 8.64 (quoting from Residues of
Veterinary Drugs in Foods, in JOINT FAO/WHO CODEX ALiMENTARIUS COMMISSION, 3
CODEx ALIMENTARIUS 65 (1995)). See Codex Maximum Residue Limits for Pesticides (vis-
ited May 7, 1998) <http://www.fao.org/waicent/faostat/pest%2Dresidue/pest%2De.
htm> (defining the "ADI" for a chemical as "the daily intake which, during an entire
lifetime, appears to be without appreciable risk to the health of the consumer on the
basis of all the known facts at the time of the evaluation of the chemical by the Joint
FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues"). For example, in the case of zeranol, a syn-
thetic hormone at issue in the Hormones Dispute, which Codex considered a weak oes-
trogen that mimics oestradiol-17[, the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food
Additives set an ADI by "[a]dopting what it considered to be a conservative approach by
... using a safety factor of 100." Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, q 8.67.
The use of safety factors is explicitly recognized as an example of risk assessment policy,
and setting an ADI for a tumorigenic agent reflects a science policy decision by the Joint
Expert Committee and by Codex. See FAQ/WHO Consultation on Risk Management,
supra note 37, at 5, 8, 15-18. A national regulation implementing an MRL would be
"primarily a regulatory tool to ensure that intake does not exceed the ADI and that good
practice is observed." Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.64. Thus, an
ADI may reflect a value judgment about how much risk is "appreciable," especially with
regard to carcinogens, and an MRL is clearly a recommendation for risk management,
not risk assessment. Cf. id. q 8.77 ("IT]he fact that an ADI or MRL can reflect a level of
protection (without stricto sensu itself being a level of protection), does not exclude...
that an ADI or MRL can also be a sanitary measure in the sense of the SPS Agreement.").
108. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.2. Cf. John S. Eldred & Shirley A. Cof-
field, What Every Food Manufacturer Needs to Know: Realizing the Impact of Globalization
on National Food Regulation, 52 FooD & DRUG LJ. 31, 33 (1997) ("The WTO dispute
resolution structure gives 'teeth' to Codex commodity standards and other international
standards by allowing governments to point to Codex standards as persuasive authority
when trade disputes arise at the WTO."). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
108 Stat. 4809 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995).
109. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (emphasis added). Note that the meaning
of "based on" in SPS article 3.1 is different from, but consistent with, the meanings of
"based on" in articles 2.2 and 5.1. See id. arts. 2.2, 5.1. While the former relates a
member's sanitary measures to Codex standards, the latter relate a member's sanitary
measures to scientific principles and to risk assessment, respectively.
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different than a permissible residue level as a means of achieving that level
of protection, in effect adopting what amounts to an "equivalent measure"
in the sense of SPS article 4.1. In either of these examples, the central
meaning of "based on" seems to be that the sanitary measure established
by the member is related to the Codex ADI by scientific principles and
offers the same level of protection as the Codex standards.110
Third, a member may choose to establish sanitary measures that pro-
vide "a higher level of sanitary... protection" than would measures that
are "based on" the Codex standards. 1 ' In such a circumstance, however,
one of two conditions must be satisfied: either there must be a "scientific
justification" for the sanitary measures, or the sanitary measures must be
"a consequence of' a higher level of protection selected in accordance with
the relevant provisions of SPS article 5.112 Regardless of which of these
conditions is met, measures that achieve a different level of protection than
that achieved by international standards must be consistent with all other
relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. 113
These two alternative and independently sufficient conditions under
the third option present a difficult task of interpretation.1 14 Given the defi-
nition of "scientific justification" that is provided,'1 5 there seems to be lit-
tle distinction between the two conditions. The first focuses on a
member's judgment about the validity of the scientific reasoning behind an
international standard or on the adequacy of an internationally recom-
110. It is not clear why the Hormones Panel found that SPS article 3.2 "equates meas-
ures based on international standards with measures which conform to such standards,"
Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.75. No reason is given for this asser-
tion, which denies the possibility that a measure can be based on an international stan-
dard and adopt the same level of protection, without conforming to a specific
recommended measure as a means of achieving that level of protection. See Appellate
Body Report, supra note 16, 1 171 ("Under Article 3.1 ... an SPS measure that is based
on the existing relevant international standard... may adopt some, not necessarily all,
of the elements of the international standard.").
111. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.3; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16,
172.
112. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.3.
113. Id. As the U.S. has stated: "By contrast [with the presumption in favor of a
conforming measure], the fact that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure differs from a
relevant international standard, guideline, or recommendation does not, in itself, create
any adverse presumption concerning that measure." Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 55, § 7. This is surely the correct view. The creation of a presump-
tion for conforming standards under SPS article 3.2 should not imply any presumption
against measures that are merely "based on" or are "higher than" the international
standard.
114. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.3; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16,
1175.
115. Note 2 to SPS article 3.3 reads:
For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if,
on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information
in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member deter-
mines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations
are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection.
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mended means to actually achieve a given level of protection. 1 16 The sec-
ond condition focuses on the selection of a different level of protection by a
member.1 17 In either case, a justification must consist of an assessment of
the risk and a determination that the chosen measure does in fact bring
about a risk reduction when compared with the international standards.
In the end, the two conditions seem to add no substantive requirements
that are not already found elsewhere in the Agreement. What then is the
point of stating them as two separate and alternative conditions? Perhaps
one reason is to emphasize a difference in the scope of review due under
the two conditions. Stating the second condition separately emphasizes
that a member's selection of a level of protection is largely unreviewable,
whereas different standards apply when a risk assessment or a determina-
tion about the means of achieving a selected level of protection is reviewed,
Although the SPS requirements for each of these functions are prescribed
elsewhere in the Agreement, 1" 8 the separate statement of these two condi-
tions in article 3.3 arguably emphasizes the distinction.
The separate statement of these two conditions in article 3.3 takes on
added significance when we consider how this "soft" harmonization strat-
egy of the SPS Agreement is likely to affect the harmonization of science
policies by members. I argued above that the adoption of particular sci-
ence policies to use in risk assessment should be viewed as an aspect of
selecting an appropriate level of protection."19 This means that a more
protective measure that a member justifies by its adopted science policies
should be evaluated under the second condition of article 3.3. By contrast,
a more protective measure that is justified by appeal to purely scientific
reasoning (whether about toxicity, exposure, or means-end causality)
should be evaluated on its merits as a "scientific justification" under the
first condition. Therefore, the two conditions partition the possible types
Id. art. 3.3 n.2.
116. The first condition is merely that there be a "scientific justification," see SPS
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.3, which is elucidated by Note 2, quoted supra note 115.
At least one commentator has suggested that this footnote might blur the distinction
between science and policy. Wirth, supra note 1, at 827. As I argue below, however, in
the text accompanying infra note 120, this footnote and SPS article 3.3 can also be read
as recognizing the distinction between science and policy.
According to the Hormones Panel, both Canada and the European Communities inter-
preted the first condition to be a possibility in situations when the international stan-
dard is "outdated" or "inadequate, faulty or obsolete from a scientific point of view,"
such as where the standard turns out not to provide the level of protection it had been
thought to provide. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, [ 8.84. However,
a new sanitary measure might be "based on" the intended level of protection, yet not
"conform to" the inadequate international recommendation or standard. This would
help give the SPS Agreement the temporal flexibility essential in those regulatory areas
characterized by pervasive scientific uncertainty but increasing scientific knowledge.
117. The second condition is if the more protective measure is "a consequence of the
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5," which
deal with conducting risk assessment and determining the appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 3.3, 5.1-5.8.
118. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
119. See supra Part I.B.1.
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of justification into "scientific" and "policy" categories. 120 If "scientific
justifications" turn out to be more reviewable than policy decisions, then
harmonization of the former can be promoted more vigorously than har-
monization of the latter - a result that is consistent with the tenor of the
SPS Agreement.
II. WTO Review of Sanitary Measures Established by Members
Under the SPS Agreement, every member retains the sovereign right to
adopt those sanitary measures necessary to achieve the level of protection
that the member selects as appropriate for its society. On the other hand,
the Agreement seeks to ensure that sanitary measures that restrict trade are
not discriminatory and are not in fact "disguised restrictions on interna-
tional trade."' 2 1 The substantive and procedural provisions of the SPS
Agreement are designed to accommodate both of these major interests.122
In general, it is easy to appreciate some of what is required in order for
the WTO to balance these interests successfully over the long run. Sub-
stantively, the WTO needs to understand the issues appropriate for
factfinding by a panel. Factfinding panels must adequately understand the
nature of risk assessment, the pervasiveness of scientific uncertainty, and
the role of science policy. Panels must also respect the differences between
risk assessment and risk management, as well as the interactions between
them.
In terms of process, panel factfinding should be fair and equitable in
its procedures, transparent in its findings and rationales, reasonably pre-
dictable in its methods and outcomes, and reasonably efficient.' 2 3 More-
120. As we have seen, "risk assessment" contains both science and policy, see supra
Part L.A, as does "risk management," see supra Part I.B. SPS article 3.3 is one place where
the Agreement comes close to recognizing a distinction between science and policy. See
SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.3.
121. See, e.g., id. arts. 2.3, 5.6.
122. Cf. Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommo-
dating Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN.J. GLoBAL TRADE
625, 649 (1997) (stating that the "overall goal" of the SPS Agreement is "to lessen the
burdens on international trade created by those health regulations not based on scien-
tific evidence").
123. Cf. DSU, supra note 7, arts. 3.2, 3.3, appendix 3.10. The U.S. Congress has
provided by statute that:
[t]he Trade Representative shall seek the adoption by the Ministerial Conference
and General Council of procedures that will ensure broader application of the
principle of transparency and clarification of the costs and benefits of trade
policy actions, through the observance of open and equitable procedures in
trade matters by the Ministerial Conference and the General Council, and by the
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body under the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3536 (1994).
Cf. Gresham & Bloomfield, supra note 61, at 1160-62 ("[T]he DSU greatly improves
public access to information in the dispute settlement process."); C. O'Neal Taylor, The
Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute Settle-
ment System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 315 (1997) (stating that with regard to
alleged violations of international trade law, the WTO dispute settlement system is "both
more legitimate and equitable than the self-help of unilateralism"); Kim Rubenstein &
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over, the acceptability of the panel process rests upon the appropriateness
of the standard governing WTO panels in reviewing the factual and policy
determinations made by members, of the "burdens of proof" placed on par-
ties, and of the appellate review over the panel findings.124
It is easy enough to state such broad, abstract goals. However, when
trying to work out the details, one encounters deeper conceptual problems.
Fine-tuning these aspects of WTO factfinding provides the best hope for
keeping the desire for trade efficiencies from threatening sovereignty, and
thus the best hope for achieving a stable long-term balance. A dominant
theme running through this Article is that a detailed understanding of sci-
entific uncertainty and science policy, and of their proper treatment within
the WTO factfinding process, provides an important means of achieving
the desired long-term balance. Central to this task is appreciating why we
must keep the WTO from becoming the "World Trans-science Organiza-
tion," and determining how this can be accomplished.
A. The Proper Substantive Issues Before a Panel
This part analyzes the content of the findings of fact to be made by WTO
panels. The focus of attention is on those findings that pose the greatest
Jenny Schultz, Bringing Law and Order to International Trade: Administrative Law Princi-
ples and the GATT/WTO, 11 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 271, 305 (1996) (stating that
the WTO dispute settlement process is a "clear movement toward administrative law
principles of due process/natural justice, broader standing, more transparency, and an
appeal mechanism which emphasizes some form of judicial review"); Michael K. Young,
Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L
LAw. 389, 409 (1995) (stating that "[clonsistency, coherence, and persuasiveness" are
qualities of substantive action necessary to confer legitimacy, as is procedural fairness).
124. Professor Wirth observed the following problems facing the WTO dispute settle-
ment process:
A number of singular issues arise from the likelihood, given the structure of the
new trade disciplines in the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA texts on standards,
that the quasi-adjudicatory dispute settlement panels will be obliged to review
the scientific foundation for national regulatory measures. The four texts
expressly address none of the following three central questions:
To what extent, if at all, must panels defer to expert scientific judgment
underlying a national standard, especially if that judgment reflects minority
or controversial views within the scientific community?
To what extent, if at all, must panels defer to expert scientific judgment
underlying a national standard when that judgment is exercised under condi-
tions of scientific uncertainty?
How should dispute settlement panels treat and structure requests for expert
scientific advice in addressing issues raised by the previous two questions?
Wirth, supra note 1, at 853. Wirth concluded that the solution must lie in the direction
of deference:
[t]he structure of these texts, the best thinking on the role of science in the
national regulatory process, considerations of scientific uncertainty, and the
negotiating histories of these agreements all suggest that dispute settlement
panels should be highly deferential to scientific determinations of national
authorities that underlie regulatory measures to protect the environment and
public health.
Id. at 858-59. However, an adequate solution is far more complicated than the deference
that Wirth proposed.
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risk that a panel will overlook scientific uncertainty and science policy and
will confuse risk assessment with risk management.
1. Reviewing Risk Assessment Determinations
A primary issue before a WTO panel is whether a member's measures are
"based on" a risk assessment appropriate to the circumstances, are "based
on" scientific principles, and are maintained with "sufficient scientific evi-
dence." 125 In short, the primary issue of fact before a panel should be
whether there is any reasonable scientific basis for a member's sanitary
measures. The United States has stated: "[i]t is clear that the requirement
in the [SPS] Agreement that measures be based on scientific principles and
not be maintained 'without sufficient scientific evidence' would not author-
ize a dispute settlement panel to substitute its scientific judgment for that
of the government maintaining the sanitary or phytosanitary measure. '126
For example, in reviewing a member's determinations in the context of risk
assessment, a panel should not decide whether it is true that the contested
food additive is a human carcinogen or whether it is true that there is no
threshold for the carcinogenic action of the contested food additive.
Instead, a panel's proper task is to make findings about whether there is
any reasonable scientific basis for a member's determinations and sanitary
125. See supra Part I.A.
126. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55, § 6.b. As the Hormones
Panel correctly concluded, the panel was not authorized to conduct its own risk assess-
ment. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11 8.104, 8.118. But see John H.
Barton, Biotechnology, the Environment, and International Agricultural Trade, 9 GEo. INT'L
ErrvL. L. REv. 95, 103 (1996) ("[T]he chances are good" that WTO panels will be less
deferential than the U.S. executive branch hopes, and will determine that "a phytosani-
tary standard must be based on scientific principles.").
The Appellate Body took a deferential approach in requiring prima fade evidence
before shifting the burden of proof to a defending member in a dispute proceeding con-
cerning the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, see Report of the Appellate Body,
United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from
India, Apr. 25, 1997, adopted May 23, 1997, 12-17, WT/DS33/AB/R, available in
Westlaw, WTO-DEC file, 1997 WL 222239 [hereinafter Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts]; cf. Edward Krauland et al., International Legal Developments in
Review: 1996 Business Regulation, International Trade, 31 INT'L LAw. 433, 441-42 (1997)
(stating that while neither the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing nor the DSB's rules
prescribe a specific standard of review for panels, some panels have "adopted a standard
of review that is analogous to that applied by U.S. courts reviewing U.S. administrative
agency determinations").
For a pre-WTO GATT panel discussion on standard of review, see Korea - Anti-
Dumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal Resins from the United States, April 2, 1993,
adopted April 27, 1993, 9 227, ADP/92 (stating that a review to decide whether a deter-
mination by the Korean Trade Commission "was based on positive evidence did not
mean that the Panel should substitute its own judgement... as to the relative weight to
be accorded to the facts .... "). As one commentator has noted, however, GATT 1947
contains no reference to science and no express requirement for deference to determina-
tions by scientific experts. Wirth, supra note 1, at 845. Additionally, at least one pre-
WTO panel is noteworthy for "its intrusive review of the exercise of expert scientific
judgment by national regulatory authorities." Id. (referring to a panel applying GATT
principles to Canada's landing requirement for Pacific Coast salmon and herring under
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement).
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On the other hand, a WTO panel cannot merely defer in its factfinding
to any member that cries "science." Not only would this render the SPS
Agreement ineffective as a trade agreement, but it could also perversely
encourage global fragmentation in science by encouraging trade protec-
tionist interests to co-opt the academy. 128 Both trade and science will ben-
efit if the WTO conceptualizes its role as an independent factfinding body.
If carefully balanced, this factfinding role can and should respect the
important science-policy divide within risk assessment.
A WTO panel should make findings on whether, with respect to a par-
ticular issue, there is a scientific consensus or scientific uncertainty. Scien-
tific uncertainty is evidenced by a good-faith difference of opinion about
plausible accounts within the scientific community. Panels will usually
discover that there is a consensus about the identity of the relevant sub-
issues within risk assessment, about which methodologies and theories are
beyond reasonable dispute, and about which models, hypotheses, or
assumptions are so unreasonable as to be scientifically implausible. On
the other hand, panels will also discover that, with regard to some distinct
sub-issues, there is uncertainty about which models to employ or which
input assumptions to make. 129 When a panel encounters such uncer-
tainty, it should make findings concerning which alternative accounts
scientists find plausible and which they do not. In so doing, a panel would
map the contours of the current scientific terrain, determining where
scientists agree on what is "proved" and what is "fanciful," as well as where
scientists disagree over plausible alternative accounts. Whenever a panel
finds a good-faith difference of opinion among scientists and finds any
reputable scientific support for a member's science-policy choices within
risk assessment, then the panel should find that the member's sanitary
measures are "based on" scientific principles and have "sufficient scientific
evidence." 130
127. See supra Part I.A; cf. Wirth, supra note 1, at 854-58 (Although "the Uruguay
Round and the NAFTA texts on standards contain no express instruction that dispute
settlement panels must accord scientific determination by national regulatory authori-
ties some measure of deference," such a conclusion "is virtually inescapable.").
128. Cf. Atik, supra note 61, at 748-51, 757-58 ("We can anticipate many cases where
scientific consensus is split along national lines.... Science... promises little hope as a
source for neutral principles to resolve economic disputes among nations.").
129. Examples of such sub-issues are enumerated supra Part 1.A.2.
130. As the Appellate Body stated:
Article 5.1 [of the SPS Agreement] does not require that the risk assessment
must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific
community. In some cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by
qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may indi-
cate a state of scientific uncertainty.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, ( 194. The Appellate Body did not establish any
quantitative or qualitative standards for evaluating the extent of scientific support
required under the SPS Agreement, holding instead that any determination should be
made "on a case-to-case basis." Id.
The United States stated the standard in terms familiar within U.S. law: a panel's task
is to find whether the member's measures are "based on scientific principles (rather
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There are numerous policy arguments why WTO panels should make
findings only about the reasonableness or plausibility of any member's risk
assessment determinations. That is, there are good policy reasons why, in
reviewing risk assessment determinations, a WTO panel should leave
undisturbed the science-policy choices of a member, so long as that mem-
ber's inferences from the available data are scientifically plausible.
First, the goal of true economic efficiency can be achieved only if the
scientific understanding of risks, costs, and benefits is accurate. The pro-
cess of scientific inquiry, however, is usually incomplete, is almost always
open to revision, and often results in differences among scientific opinions.
Therefore, when scientists themselves are uncertain which of two alterna-
tive accounts is the correct or accurate one, and members choose differ-
ently from among these plausible accounts, then the WTO should wait for
the scientific community to resolve that uncertainty, rather than impose
the views of a single group of scientists on all WTO members. 13'
WTO panels, therefore, should determine whether there is a scientific
consensus on a factual issue and whether there is a good-faith difference of
opinion among scientists. Whenever a panel finds scientific uncertainty
and finds a difference of opinion among reputable scientists, then the
panel should not impose its own opinion of the matter on members. The
existence of scientific uncertainty itself should be compelling evidence to a
WTO panel that each of the alternative accounts under debate is scientifi-
cally plausible, and that a sanitary measure justified by any such account
is "based on" scientific principles and has "sufficient scientific evi-
dence."'132 WTO panels should respect the open-endedness of scientific
inquiry. If they do not, they will be abandoning "good science" as the
foundational principle of the SPS Agreement, and placing a higher value on
than, for instance, requiring measures to be based on the 'best' science)" and whether
there is "sufficient scientific evidence (rather than, for instance, requiring an examina-
tion of the 'weight of evidence')." Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 55,
§ 6.b.
Some commentators have urged an analogy to the law governing judicial review of the
scientific determinations of administrative agencies such as the EPA or FDA. This
aspect of U.S. administrative law is a carefully constructed balance between a court's
duty to ensure administrative transparency and the rule of law, on the one hand, and the
expertise and policy-setting mandate of the administrative agencies, on the other. See,
e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976) (ruling that the pertinent arbitrary and capricious standard is merely an inquiry
into whether the agency decision at issue was rational). However, several distinguishing
characteristics between WTO panels and domestic reviewing courts are discussed in
this part of the Article and infra Part II.B, and the analogy should not be pressed too far.
One distinction is that WTO panels are factfinding entities of an international trade
institution, the findings of which are subject to only limited appellate review. The con-
stitutional matrix of the U.S. government cannot be simply transferred to the interna-
tional setting.
131. But see Carter, supra note 122, at 64849 (The fact that "there is no accepted level
of 'certainty' with regard to scientific data ... directly conflicts with the stated goal of
the SPS Agreement. Moreover, in order to regulate confidently, Members must be given
a baseline level of certainty which can be used to justify health-related regulations.").
132. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2.
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WTO-imposed uniformity than on regulation that is genuinely efficient
and is based on accurate science.
Second, a panel's findings of fact should not undermine the integrity
and autonomy of the members' domestic regulation of human health and
safety. 133 The risk assessment scientists within the regulatory institutions
of a member state should not have to worry about their scientific determi-
nations being second-guessed, years after the fact, by a WTO panel decid-
ing an international trade dispute. Restricting WTO factfinding to
"reasonableness" should provide enough predictability to safeguard domes-
tic regulatory factfinding from overly intrusive WTO factfinding. More-
over, findings of fact on scientific issues often have implications beyond a
single dispute, creating precedent for science-policy determinations in
legally dissimilar areas. For example, a major impetus behind the develop-
ment of risk assessment methodology in the United States was a desire to
harmonize different agencies' approaches to regulating carcinogenicity. 134
A WTO panel decision that a particular compound is not carcinogenic
might indirectly affect a purely domestic controversy about the appropriate
level of cleanup for a toxic waste site. If WTO panels are empowered to
make choices among scientifically plausible alternatives and to impose
those choices on members, then this may affect risk assessment in domes-
tic regulatory areas unrelated to international trade.
Third, as discussed above, most risk assessments incorporate science
policies into decisions about which factual assumptions to make in the face
of data gaps, or about which mathematical models to use in dose-response
assessment or exposure assessment. 13 5 Science-policy choices are perva-
sive and numerous. It can be extremely difficult to identify every assump-
tion and default rule underlying a given risk assessment, and the
adversarial context of a WTO panel is not the ideal forum in which to
inventory all science policies. Moreover, as argued above, WTO panels
should have only limited authority to find that a member's decision to
adopt a particular science policy is inconsistent with the SPS Agree-
ment.136 In view of these major constraints on legitimate WTO factfind-
ing, it would be prudent to restrict factfinding to a zone of reasonableness
when risk assessment determinations involve scientific uncertainty.
Fourth, a WTO panel does not have the institutional capacity to
decide among scientifically plausible alternatives. Domestic regulatory
agencies such as EPA or the European Commission have the depth and
continuity of expert staff needed to weigh the conflicting evidence about
scientific uncertainty. These agencies can also make a weight-of-evidence
determination at any one point in time, and stand ready to re-evaluate that
evidence when new studies become available. A WTO panel, on the other
133. Cf. Wirth, supra note 1, at 854-58 (arguing that concern about disrupting
national regulatory programs is one factor in favor of showing deference to national
scientific determinations).
134. See, e.g., NRC (1983), supra note 21, at 1-8.
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See supra Part I.B.1.
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hand, is formed to decide the merits of a particular case at a particular
point in time. It has neither the resources nor the mandate to monitor and
re-evaluate an evolving scientific debate. A WTO panel should leave any
member's scientific judgments undisturbed whenever the panel finds that
the current state of science provides a reasonable basis for those
judgments.
Fifth, appellate review within the WTO is limited. If WTO panels are
empowered to evaluate the relative merits of plausible scientific alternatives
and to choose which alternative to impose upon a party to a WTO dispute,
then this "finding of fact" by the panel cannot be reviewed effectively by the
Appellate Body.1 3 7 Therefore, over time, different WTO panels may make
different and inconsistent scientific determinations. This could have a
confounding effect both on the scientific debate itself and on the domestic
regulatory institutions of WTO members. The only viable solution to this
problem is to hold that WTO panels do not have the authority to decide
which plausible scientific alternative is most likely to be true. Panels
should have authority only to decide whether there is any 'reputable sup-
port within the scientific community for a member's determination of sci-
entific fact. 138
Sixth, whenever the subject matter of a trade dispute is the protection
of human health, there is an additional policy reason for deferring to those
plausible determinations by members that tend to protect human beings
from additional risk.139 When there is a reasonable scientific basis for a
member's determination that a sanitary measure will provide better protec-
tion for human health, then there is no compelling and competing WTO
policy that justifies disregarding scientific uncertainty or resolving a scien-
tific dispute by fiat.
Seventh, although the WTO has a legitimate goal of fostering the trans-
parency of members' factfinding when a member's sanitary measures
137. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 17.6 ("An appeal shall be limited to issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.").
138. See Wirth, supra note 1, at 855 (arguing that "any domestic scientific determina-
tion that has withstood scientific peer review should be categorically presumed to sat-
isfy the science-based disciplines in either the Uruguay Round or the NAFTA"). What
can pass for "peer review," however, is so diverse that it should not be considered, as
Wirth claims, "the scientific analogue of a procedural .. .test." Id. Wirth himself
acknowledges that there are possible weaknesses in "peer review." Id. at 842-43.
139. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 194 (stating that the fact of members
acting in good faith on the basis of scientific opinion that diverges from the "main-
stream" scientific opinion "does not necessarily signal the absence of a reasonable rela-
tionship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially where the risk
involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and immi-
nent threat to public health and safety"). Cf. Wirth, supra note 1, at 851 (noting that in
the panel reports in cases prior to the Uruguay Round and NAFTA, several cases "may
suggest a predisposition to greater deference in the context of regulations designed to
protect public health.., than in situations involving preservation of the environment or
natural resources ...."). A failure by the WTO to give added deference might itself
constitute a disregard for the precautionary principle of international environmental
law. See supra note 77.
Cornell International Law Journal
restrict the flow of trade, 140 this goal can be achieved by requiring mem-
bers to disclose their reasons for establishing those sanitary measures.' 41
Once the scientific bases for those underlying factual determinations have
been made clear to the international community, whether in proceedings
before the domestic regulatory institutions of a member or in scientific evi-
dence produced before the WTO panel, this policy objective has been
achieved. Therefore, the objective of fostering transparency does not itself
justify WTO factfinding about the truth of a scientific issue, as contrasted
with factfinding merely about reasonableness. On the contrary, the inter-
ests of transparency are not served by having WTO factfinding panels
behaving like quasi-scientific expert panels, mimicking scientific investiga-
tions, and making findings of fact about the truth of scientific propositions.
WTO panels can better promote transparency by acting merely as careful
consumers of scientific information. WTO panels should remain general-
ist and non-expert factfinders, who hear the scientific explanations that the
parties and expert advisors present to them, and make findings only on the
issue of the "reasonableness" of those explanations.
Finally, the WTO may have a legitimate goal of promoting domestic
regulatory procedures that allow potentially affected private parties or
potentially affected members to produce scientific evidence relevant to par-
ticular sanitary measures and to ensure consideration of that evidence by
the member adopting the sanitary measures. 142 Once members have had
an opportunity to produce scientific evidence, however, whether in domes-
tic regulatory proceedings or before a WTO panel, this policy objective has
been achieved. Therefore, this objective does not require WTO factfinding
about the relative weight of evidence among plausible scientific accounts.
If this analysis is correct, and WTO panels should engage in factfind-
ing only about the reasonableness of a risk assessment or about the plausi-
bility of scientific determinations made by members in the context of risk
assessment, a consensus on "scientific plausibility" itself may evolve. 143 I
propose that WTO panels should make findings about the extent of scien-
tific uncertainty in risk assessments, and about which alternative accounts
have sufficient backing by reputable scientists. As panels explain their
rationales for such findings, they may develop criteria for scientific plausi-
140. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 7; DSU, supra note 7, app. 3.10; cf.
Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National
Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1944, 1968 (1997) (reviewing THoMAS M.
FRANCK, FAiRNEss IN INTERNATIONAL LAv AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)) ("A corollary to more
open participation at the norm-creation stage, and a key to accountability, is that the
decisionmaking process must be more transparent.").
141. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.8.
142. This may be a long-range result deriving indirectly from the WTO dispute settle-
ment process, rather than an explicitly stated goal. This parallels American law, where
the need for a record upon which to base judicial review has prompted agencies to create
administrative records where none are explicitly required by statute. See Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-21, 91 S. Ct. 814, 823-26 (1971).
143. Cf. Wirth, supra note 1, at 855-56 (suggesting a list of questions that a panel
might consider "in determining whether a challenged measure qualifies as minimally
,scientific"' in situations where prior peer review is absent).
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bility that are acceptable not only to members and interested private par-
ties, but also to the scientific community itself. If such criteria evolve, then
WTO proceedings can become more objective and more predictable, and
the potential for WTO intrusion into domestic risk assessment will remain
limited.
2. Reviewing Risk Management Decisions
As discussed above, a member's selection of a level of protection is a value-
based act of sovereignty and is subject to very limited review.144 In review-
ing such a selection at the present time, a WTO panel need only find the
mere fact of selection. Perhaps the standing Committee will develop guide-
lines for determining whether different internal levels of protection are
"consistent," or whether they represent "arbitrary and unjustifiable distinc-
tions."145 Even when different levels are selected by a member, the differ-
ence might be "justified" by considering the balance of risks and
benefits. 14 6
The WTO has a greater factfinding role with respect to the measures
chosen as means to achieve a selected level of protection. First, a panel
considers whether a given sanitary measure is "based on" a risk assess-
ment appropriate to the circumstances, is "based on" scientific principles,
and is supported by "sufficient scientific evidence."14 7 These findings are
simply those discussed in the previous part on risk assessment.148 The
issue to be decided is whether there is any reasonable scientific basis for a
member's assessment of the risk.
In evaluating measures as means, however, science can play an eviden-
tiary role in issues beyond risk assessment. A panel should also determine
whether there is a reasonable cause-and-effect relationship between the
sanitary measure chosen and the member's selected level of protection.14 9
A trade-restrictive sanitary measure is justifiable only if it is reasonably
effective in bringing about actual protection - in reducing or avoiding the
risks identified by risk assessment. Also at issue is whether there is an
alternative measure that is at least as effective at risk reduction as the mea-
sure chosen, but which has collateral effects that are less trade-restric-
tive.150 Each of these questions is factual and involves determinations of
causation. They are therefore proper objects of scientific inquiry. In fact,
they are usually questions about differences in resulting exposure under
144. See supra Part I.B.1.
145. See id.
146. It is beyond the scope of this Article to propose how these concepts should be
elucidated. However, it is worthwhile to note here that cost-benefit rationales for differ-
ent levels of protection will usually rest on causal and economic models that employ
both data and input assumptions. These rationales will also contain scientific uncer-
tainty and may employ science policies. They may therefore require review by WTO
panels similar to the review of risk assessments. That is, assessments of expected net
benefits should pass scrutiny if but only if they are scientifically plausible.
147. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 5.1, 2.2.
148. See supra Part II.A.1.
149. See supra Part I.B.2.
150. See id.
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the various measures being compared, and can be answered systematically
only by conducting exposure assessment and risk assessment. Such com-
parisons also involve questions of comparative efficiency, and the extent to
which the measures impose different burdens on international trade.
Scientific determinations are also involved whenever a panel must
decide whether an exporting member's means of protection is "equivalent"
to an importing member's sanitary measures. Again, the issue presented is
whether alternative measures would achieve the same level of protection.
Making such a determination requires conducting risk assessment for each
alternative measure and comparing the results.
Many of the same issues are presented when a complaining member
alleges a violation of SPS article 3, which deals with harmonization. 151 As
discussed above, 152 a member must select one of three options: (1) it may
conform its sanitary measures to existing international standards, guide-
lines or recommendations; (2) it may base its sanitary measures on such
international standards but not merely conform to them; or (3) it may
adopt measures that provide a higher level of protection than would meas-
ures based on such international standards. Findings of conformity would
presumably be the easiest for a panel to make. If option (2) is taken, how-
ever, a panel would be called upon to review the scientific justification for
the alternative, non-conforming measure. If option (3) is at issue, a panel
must compare risk assessments to determine whether the measure chosen
is in fact more protective than a conforming measure would be. Thus, the
contents of the findings required to resolve disputes under article 3 of the
SPS Agreement are of the same type as those for other disputes involving
risk assessment and risk management.
The important thing to note is that in reviewing the risk management
decisiqns of a member, WTO panels are repeatedly called upon to review
risk assessment and scientific determinations by members. Therefore, the
argument developed above also applies here: the task of a WTO panel
should be to find whether there is any reasonable basis for a member's risk
assessment and scientific determinations, and whether the member's sci-
ence-policy choices employed scientifically plausible alternatives. 153 This
formulation of the proper substantive issues before a WTO panel recog-
nizes the panel's objective factfinding role, but keeps a panel from second-
guessing both scientists and the science policy officials of members. It
also affords the deference required when science policies implement a sov-
ereign member's selection of an appropriate level of protection.
151. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 3.
152. See supra Part I.C.
153. See supra Part IL.A1. Cf. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656, 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2871 (1980) (plurality opinion) (stating
that, under the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, "so long as they are sup-
ported by a body of reputable scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative
assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the
side of overprotection rather than underprotection").
Vol. 31
1998 'World Trans-science Organization"
B. The Evidence Available to a Panel
If WTO panels are to make findings about the scientific plausibility of the
alternative accounts that are subject to science-policy choices by WTO
members, what evidence should a panel consider in making its findings?
The growth hormones dispute raised the issue of whether the Panel's delib-
erations should proceed on the basis of all evidence produced in its pro-
ceeding, or whether the Panel should confine itself to considering only the
evidence that had been available to decision-makers prior to the proceed-
ing.154 The Hormones Panel decided to limit itself to the historical evi-
dence, and to discount or ignore "new evidence" produced in the WTO
proceeding by the European Communities.' 5 5 A closely related question is
whether to interpret the SPS requirement for "risk assessment" to require
every member to undertake a risk assessment procedure prior to institut-
ing a sanitary measure. If there is such a procedural requirement, then in
any dispute about whether a measure is "based on an assessment... of the
risks," the panel can regard the issue before it as an issue of historical fact.
The panel would then be called upon to determine whether the defendant
member had in fact conducted an adequate risk assessment prior to insti-
tuting or maintaining its challenged sanitary measure.
In possible conflict with this objective of enforcing procedural require-
ments on members, a panel has a substantive task. The mandate of a panel
is to determine whether there is any reasonable scientific basis for a mem-
ber's sanitary measures. The presumption should be that, to perform this
task as well as possible, a panel should consider all relevant evidence rea-
sonably available to the panel. This presumption should be overcome only
when a competing and compelling institutional policy requires excluding
"new evidence" from consideration.
WTO panels might be tempted to make their task more manageable by
adopting a model of judicial review familiar from American administrative
law in which the reviewing court confines its determination to the record
that was before the agency at the time of the agency's decision.156 How-
ever, WTO panels differ from domestic courts conducting judicial review
of domestic administrative agencies. In the American system, the review-
ing court is sometimes an appellate court, which has extremely limited
154. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.118. Such prior evidence
might include the evidence available to the European Communities when they estab-
lished the measures in dispute, or that available to the Codex Commission when it estab-
lished the relevant ADIs and MRLs.
155. Id. This decision is discussed infra Part III.B.
156. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20, 91 S.
Ct. 814, 825 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 14243, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 1244 (1973)
("[Tihe focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.").
Within American law, however, there are many institutional and constitutional poli-
cies bearing on this issue - policies such as separation -of powers, autonomy of agen-
cies, judicial integrity, and legislative intent (statutory interpretation). How similar
policies would apply in the WTO context raises fundamental issues about institutional
legitimacy and prudential policies that go far beyond the scope of this Article. The dis-
cussion here is limited, therefore, to considerations directly related to WTO factfinding.
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factfinding authority. A WTO panel, by contrast, has primarily a factfind-
ing mandate. In the American system, the issue before a reviewing court is
often whether an agency acted or made findings in a manner that was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law." 157 Other portions of the American statutory matrix explic-
itly direct courts to review how the agency acted in light of the record
before the agency. 158 A WTO panel, by contrast, is charged with finding
whether there is any reasonable scientific basis for a sanitary measure.1 5 9
It should focus on the sanitary measure and the state of scientific knowl-
edge at the time of the panel proceeding. While members' past domestic
proceedings may be a valuable source of evidence, they should not provide
the only evidence of scientific plausibility that a panel may consider.
A number of policy arguments can be given for why WTO panels
should rely upon the best scientific information available. First, the WTO
has an institutional interest in efficient regulation based on accurate sci-
ence. Real efficiencies are likely to be created only if the cause-and-effect
relationships surrounding products and trade are understood and
respected. Domestic courts may be free to distance themselves from the
ultimate effects of the regulatory decisions they are reviewing because the
regulatory responsibility lies with the agency and the task of the court is
merely to keep the agency from unlawful action.160 But the WTO should
not so distance itself. Realizing true economic efficiencies, redressing mar-
ket imperfections, and achieving regulatory legitimacy depend upon accu-
rately assessing scientific plausibility. Due to its interest in the efficient
working of the international trade system, the WTO is more like an admin-
istrative agency than it is like a reviewing court.
Second, although the WTO has an interest in accurate science, the
process of scientific inquiry often generates differences among scientific
opinions. Thus, the WTO's institutional interest has two aspects. On the
one hand, whenever scientists are uncertain, the WTO should wait for the
scientific community to resolve that uncertainty. It should not impose one
of the alternative plausible accounts on WTO members. On the other
hand, the WTO should not blind itself to advances in scientific knowledge
and the gradual resolution of scientific uncertainties. A WTO panel
should consider whatever relevant evidence is available at the time of the
dispute. In many cases, we can expect that the object of challenge will be
157. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
158. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557, 706(2)(E) (1994)
(directing courts to review whether an agency's findings had substantial evidence in a
record created at an administrative hearing).
159. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2.
160. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
864-66, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2792-93 (1984) (holding that certain "policy arguments are
more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges," that federal
judges - who are not experts, are not part of either political branch of government, and
have no constituency - "have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices" of the political
branches, and that "[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices ... are not judicial ones").
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old sanitary measures based on once accepted but now outmoded science.
In such a case, a panel should be free to take into account recent evidence
that shows an earlier view to be no longer plausible.
Third, the WTO has an interest in ensuring both that potentially
affected members have an opportunity to produce scientific evidence rele-
vant to particular sanitary measures, and that such evidence is properly
considered. 161 But the opportunity to produce scientific evidence can be
assured only if it is afforded before a WTO panel. In the growth hormones
case, the responding party wanted the panel to consider new evidence.162
It is also possible that the complaining party would seek to produce new
evidence because it is dissatisfied with the defending party's domestic risk
assessment proceedings. All parties to a dispute should have the right to
present all relevant evidence to the panel and to have such evidence consid-
ered as fully as any other evidence.
Fourth, whenever there is uncertainty concerning the protection of
human health, there is an additional policy reason for making a decision
on the basis of the best scientific evidence available. When new evidence
might present a reasonable scientific basis for a member's determination
that a sanitary measure will provide better protection for human health,
there is no compelling and competing WTO policy that justifies a panel's
refusal to consider that evidence.
A fifth consideration is that WTO panels do not have the capacity to
monitor scientific evidence, and it is costly to re-evaluate such evidence
whenever new information becomes available. If a sanitary measure is
challenged and a panel may consider only the scientific evidence available
at the time the sanitary measure was adopted, a losing defendant member
might simply conduct a new risk assessment and enact a new measure
immediately after the DSB decision. Consequently, a new panel would be
required to consider the new scientific evidence. It is much more efficient
to review all of the scientific evidence available at the time the panel
decides the merits of a particular case.163 In this respect, a panel should
act more like a court conducting a trial de novo than like a court con-
ducting judicial review of an administrative agency's proceedings.
Finally, American courts have found that attempting to restrict judi-
cial review to the record before the agency at the time of the agency's deci-
sion is a complicated task.' 64 The problem of identifying what constitutes
the agency's record is much easier in formal, trial-type administrative pro-
ceedings than it is in informal rulemakings. 165 Is the WTO to identify "the
161. See supra text accompanying note 142.
162. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cl 8.118.
163. Cf. Dunoff, supra note 61, at 1111-13 (discussing the importance of impartial
monitoring of changing scientific knowledge in the context of trade/environment
conflicts).
164. See generally Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts
to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 333 (1984).
165. See id. at 338-39; KENN'mm Cu'P DAvis & RicHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINSTRATWE
LAv TRaTISE § 7.4, at 313-14 (3d ed. 1994); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINIsTRATvE LAW § 13.10.3, at 500-04 (1993).
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official record" for all of the different types of governmental proceedings
undertaken by its members? Would such an approach lead to WTO rul-
ings on what constitutes "the record for WTO purposes"? This approach
seems both unwarranted and difficult. Moreover, even if a workable con-
cept of such a record could be achieved, it is likely that WTO panels, like
American courts, would not respect the boundaries set by their own doc-
trine. 166 For many of the policy reasons discussed above, panels will
sometimes find it necessary to consider information not within the mem-
ber's historical record. This should not be too surprising when one consid-
ers that a member's domestic record can be created at the member's
discretion. A WTO panel should be free to perform its factfinding without
being constrained by the record-making procedures of its members.
In conclusion, a WTO panel should consider all relevant scientific evi-
dence available to it when it determines whether sanitary measures are
supported by scientifically plausible accounts of risk.
C. The Standard and Burden of Proof
This part discusses the standard of proof that a panel should employ in its
factfinding and other aspects of the burden of proof placed on parties. 167
It is essential to keep the following concepts distinct: (1) the standard of
proof to be employed by the panel as it finds facts, (2) the burden of per-
suasion placed on parties, (3) the minimum requirements of rational infer-
ence and (4) the burden of producing evidence. These concepts apply to
very different aspects of factfinding and respond to very different policies.
First, the standard of proof is the legal standard a panel should use to
make its findings of fact. 168 The standard of proof establishes the quality
of evidence and degree of certainty needed before a positive finding may be
made. It is common to express the standard of proof appropriate in a non-
criminal proceeding as the "preponderance" or the "greater weight" of the
evidence. 169 A WTO panel should likewise assess all the evidence for and
against any factual proposition and should adopt the proposition as a find-
166. See generally Stark & Wald, supra note 164 (cataloguing exceptions to the rule
that judicial review should proceed on the basis of the administrative record alone).
167. Cf. Dunoff, supra note 61, at 1079-80 (noting that in challenges to environmen-
tal measures under NAFTA, issue of burden of proof is unclear and "is unlikely to be
clarified until an actual dispute between the parties is adjudicated").
168. Cf. Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Const. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2279 (1993) (The three customary standards
of proof - "preponderance," "dear and convincing," and "beyond a reasonable doubt"
- indicate degrees of certainty required; before finding for the party who has the burden
of proof, the factfinder "must evaluate the raw evidence, finding it to be sufficiently
reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth of the asserted proposition
with the requisite degree of certainty.").
169. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7,14 (1992); 2 McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (John William Strong ed., 1992); Vern R. Walker, Preponder-
ance, Probability and Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REy. 1075 (1996). On the use
of the preponderance standard in international tribunals, see MOJTABA KAZAZi, BURDEN
OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
347-50 (1996) (If "the primafacie evidence produced by the proponent of the burden of
proof is challenged by the other party, and the tribunal decides the case on the basis of
Vol. 31
1998 'World Trans-science Organization"
ing if, but only if, the greater weight of evidence supports the proposition.
A panel need not be certain that the proposition is true, nor does the prop-
osition need to be scientifically proven. What should be required is a
determination by a panel that the proposition at issue is more likely to be
true than false.
The standard of proof is distinct from the content of the issues to be
proved. The content of the principal issue before a panel is whether there
is a reasonable scientific basis for the challenged sanitary measures. 170
The standard of proof to be used in making this finding is a preponderance
of the evidence. The panel need not be certain that there is a reasonable
scientific basis for the sanitary measures, or that the science-policy choices
of the member are scientifically plausible. After considering all of the evi-
dence on plausibility, the panel should find a member's choices to be plau-
sible if the panel concludes that, more likely than not, there is a reasonable
scientific basis for the choice.' 7 '
Second, there must be a default rule for making a finding when the
weight of evidence is in "equipoise" - that is, when it appears to a panel
that the evidence for a proposition seems equal in weight to the evidence
for its negation. 172 Facifinders need a "tie-breaking rule" to make findings
when the evidence favors neither side. In such cases, the party with the
"burden of persuasion" is the party who should lose on the issue unless it
persuades the panel to its view by a preponderance of the evidence. 173 Par-
ties to a treaty should enjoy a presumption that they are complying with
the treaty unless a complaining party proves otherwise. 174 The com-
plaining party should bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of
whether there has been a treaty violation, 175 and findings should be made
evaluation of evidence produced by both parties, then the preponderance of evidence is
the proper term.").
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. The confusion of content (what is to be proved) with standard (degree of proof
required) encourages the mistake of considering a WTO panel as a reviewing court, with
the task of determining only whether a member acted reasonably in the past by consid-
ering only the record before that member at the time the member acted. See supra Part
II.B. The preponderance standard does not require certainty, but that does not mean
that a panel is deferring to the factfinding of a member. Rather, the panel conducts its
own factfinding into the scientific plausibility of a member's risk characterization.
172. On the need for a default rule and on the burden of persuasion, see generally
JAMEs ET AL., supra note 169, § 7.13; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 169, § 336.
173. See JAMEs Er ., supra note 169, § 7.13, at 338 ("A concept of the risk of nonper-
suasion is inseparable from any system in which issues of fact are to be decided through
rational deliberation on the basis of incomplete knowledge.").
174. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 26, 8 I.L.M. 679, 690 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATnONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 321 (1987) ("Every international agreement in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
175. See Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 16. See
JohnJ. Barcel6 Il, Product Standards to Protect the Local Environment - The GATT and the
Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L J. 755, 764,
774-75 (1994) (arguing that the burden of proof should rest on the challenging WTO
member, not the respondent); cf. KAzAzi, supra note 169, at 53-117, 221-35 (discussing
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against the complaining party when the evidence of a violation is in equi-
poise. 176 Therefore, a complaining member should have the burden of per-
suading a panel that there is no reasonable scientific basis for the
defending member's sanitary measures. In the context of scientific uncer-
tainty and risk assessment, this would usually mean proving that any risk-
oriented reasoning invoked by the defending member is not scientifically
plausible and has no real support in the scientific community. 177
Third, the WTO Appellate Body should hold panels to a standard of
rational inference. 178 A panel's finding should be reversed if the record
before the panel does not contain the minimal evidence that any reason-
able person would consider necessary to support such a finding. 179 For
the rule of actori incumbit probatio, the rule that the party who alleges a fact must prove
the truth of its claim).
176. As the Appellate Body has stated with respect to the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing:
we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could
work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might
amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribu-
nals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consist-
ently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact . . .is
responsible for providing proof thereof.
Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 14.
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. The DSU prescribes the factfinding function of panels:
a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including
an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and con-
formity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as
will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings pro-
vided for in the covered agreements.
DSU, supra note 7, art. 11. With respect to the Appellate Body, "la]n appeal shall be
limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
by the panel." Id. art. 17.6. Additionally, "Itihe Appellate Body may uphold, modify or
reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel." Id. art. 17.13. However, the
Appellate Body "lacks the power to remand a dispute back to the panel." Taylor, supra
note 123, at 256.
The Appellate Body's authority to hold panels to a minimal standard of rational infer-
ence derives from the DSU requirements that a panel make an "objective assessment" of
the case and that the Appellate Body should decide "issues of law" and "legal interpreta-
tions," including an interpretation of what constitutes an "objective assessment." See
DSU, supra note 7, arts. 11, 17.6. If a panel were to reach factual conclusions without a
reasonable basis in the evidence or without an adequate account of its reasoning, then
the Appellate Body should not rule that the panel had made an "objective assessment of
the matter before it." See id. Therefore, this standard of reasonableness derives from the
DSU's prescription of objectivity.
179. On the concept of minimally sufficient evidence, see generallyJaMES Er A.., supra
note 169, §§ 7.19, 12.9; McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 169, § 338. But see KAZAZI,
supra note 169, at 21-38, 368 ("IThere is no place in international proceedings for the
Anglo-American dual concept of the burden of proof," which distinguishes burden of
persuasion, on the one hand, and burden of production or sufficiency of evidence, on
the other.). However, the reasons given by Kazazi - that there are no technical rules of
evidence and no jury in international proceedings - are not persuasive in the WTO
context. What drives the development of a concept of minimally sufficient evidence and
at least some rules of evidence is not merely the presence of a jury, but also the existence
of an appellate body that may set aside only those findings of fact that are erroneous as
a matter of law.
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example, if a panel should have taken into account highly relevant and
available evidence but failed to do so, then it has acted in an arbitrary and
unreasonable manner. 180 Upon appellate review, the Appellate Body
should determine whether a panel's record contained the minimal rational
support needed for the panel's findings. 813 A panel could also act unrea-
sonably by failing to give any account of its reasoning from the evi-
dence. 182 The scope of the Appellate Body's review of a panel's findings of
fact should be a deferential one. So long as a panel acts reasonably in
basing its findings on the evidence before it, the Appellate Body should not
substitute its judgment for that of the panel. If, however, a panel acts arbi-
trarily in making its findings, thereby violating the minimum requirements
of rational inference, then its findings should be set aside.183
Finally, with respect to any particular factual issue, the parties may
180. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct.
814, 823-24 (1971) (holding that in order to make a finding that agency action was not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
an American reviewing court "must consider whether the [agency's] decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment").
181. Article 12.7 of the DSU provides that "the report of a panel shall set out the
findings of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions and the basic rationale behind
any findings and recommendations that it makes." DSU, supra note 7, art. 12.7. Thus,
the DSU requires panels to provide in their reports the information needed for meaning-
ful Appellate Body review. See infra note 183. <
182. See DSU, supra note 7, art. 12.7 and infra note 183; cf. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at
415-21, 91 S. Ct. at 823-26 (remanding case where reviewing district court had failed to
create a judicial record that was adequate to support the findings required in judicial
review).
183. The Appellate Body's review of a panel's findings about scientific plausibility
should be a very different process than a panel's review of a member's scientific determi-
nation. The lack of parallel derives from both the record on review and the issues on
review. As for the record on review, the Appellate Body should consider only evidence
that was in the record before the panel. However, the panel has the authority and should
have the obligation to create a record containing current scientific information and
should not restrict the scientific evidence it considers to evidence from a certain time
period or domestic proceeding in the past. See supra Part ll.B. Both the Appellate Body
and a panel must draft their reports "in the light of the information provided and the
statements made" before them. DSU, supra note 7, arts. 17.10, 14.2. Unlike the Appel-
late Body, however, a panel has "the right to seek information and technical advice from
any individual or body which it deems appropriate." Id. art. 13; cf. id. app. 3.8. More-
over, if a panel requests an advisory report from an "expert review group" in accordance
with article 13.2, that expert review group in turn has the authority to "consult and seek
information and technical advice from any source they deem appropriate." Id. app. 4.4.
Additionally, any member is required to "respond promptly and fully to any request by
an expert review group for such information as the expert review group considers neces-
sary and appropriate." Id. Unlike the Appellate Body, a panel has the mandate and
authority to gather that evidence which it considers relevant to its facifinding.
As for the issues on review, the Appellate Body should determine whether the panel's
record contained an adequate basis for the findings the panel made. For example, the
Appellate Body should determine whether the panel's record contained the minimum
evidence necessary to sustain a finding of scientific plausibility. The factfinding panel,
by contrast, should use its best judgment to find whether the scientific evidence pro-
duced in its own proceeding proves, by a preponderance, that a member's measures have
reasonable scientific support. But so long as there exists minimally sufficient scientific
evidence in the panel's record and a reasonable person could have arrived at the panel's
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have various burdens of producing evidence placed on them. 184 A panel is
not primarily an investigative institution with the capacity to generate all of
its own evidence. Consequently, a panel must have rules that dictate when
a party must produce evidence to the panel, and how much evidence that
party must produce in order to avoid summary decision against it. Under
the SPS Agreement, a complaining party "must establish a prima facie case
of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement .... 185
A member claiming a violation of a fundamental obligation under an agree-
ment "must assert and prove its claim."'186 That is, the complaining party
must produce a prima facie case on any factual issues essential to its
claim.18 7 The phrase "prima facie case" may have different meanings in
different legal settings. 188 For purposes of WTO factfinding under the SPS
Agreement, evidence should constitute a prima facie case if (a) it is suffi-
cient to provide the minimum rational support for an inference to the
requested finding and (b) it would be in fact persuasive to the panel if no
contrary evidence were produced. A prima facie case must therefore be of
sufficient quality to pass appellate review for reasonableness and of suffi-
cient weight to persuade the panel in the absence of rebuttal evidence.
conclusion, then the Appellate Body must defer and not substitute its judgment for that
of the panel.
184. On the burden of production, seeJAmEs r A.., supra note 169, § 7.15; McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 169, § 338.
185. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1198; see Measure Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 13. Although several GATT and WTO panels
have placed on defending members the burden of proving an exception under GATT
Article XX, the Appellate Body has held that these provisions are "limited exceptions
from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules
establishing obligations in themselves." Id. at 16. The burden of establishing such
"affirmative defenses" should rest on the party asserting them. When, however, a com-
plaining party alleges a violation of a provision setting down "a fundamental part of the
rights and obligations of WTO Members," that party "must assert and prove its claim."
Id.
The Hormones Panel reasoned that the fact that article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement
explicitly establishes a presumption that a conforming measure is consistent with both
the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994 suggests that the "burden of proof" in all other
situations rests on the defending member, or at least "shifts" the burden to that member
after some initial showing by the complaining member. Hormones Panel Report (CAN),
supra note 13, 8.57. This reasoning was rejected by the Appellate Body as a misinter-
pretation of the SPS Agreement. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, T1I 102-05.
186. See Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 16.
187. For a discussion of the phrase "prima facie evidence" in the context of interna-
tional tribunals, see KAzAzI, supra note 169, at 326-43 (discussing meaning of "prima
facie evidence" and reporting the "generally uncontested" definition that it is evidence
which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to maintain the proposition
affirmed; such evidence "shifts the burden of evidence from the proponent of the burden
of proof to the other party," where "burden of evidence" means "burden of presenting
evidence," not "burden of proof").
188. See id. In another context, the DSU refers to an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement as "prima facie to constitute a case of nullification
or impairment." DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.8. In article 3.8, "primafacie case" means that
"there is normally a presumption" that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on
other members, and that "it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has
been brought to rebut the charge." Id. This DSU provision is consistent with the inter-
pretation of "prima facie" proposed in this Article.
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By definition, therefore, once a complaining party has produced a
prima facie case, the member against whom the complaint has been
brought faces a tactical decision: either produce convincing rebuttal evi-
dence or suffer adverse findings.'8 9 It may be misleading, however, to
speak of any "shift" in the "burden of proof' in such a situation.190 The
burden of persuasion on any issue essential to proving infringement of the
Agreement should not be placed on the defending party. Moreover, a for-
mal burden of production should be assigned to a defending party only in
very unusual circumstances, such as when that party has peculiar access to
important evidence. 19 1 In the dynamics of the normal proof process, there
may come a point when the defending party will lose unless it produces
convincing rebuttal evidence. But this does not mean that any burdens of
persuasion or production have been shifted to that party.
This allocation of roles in the factfinding process is consistent with the
general presumption of good-faith compliance for members, as well as with
the substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement.' 92 In disputes involving
the SPS Agreement, the complaining member should produce a prima.facie
case that the Agreement has been violated. In disputes involving article
2.2, for example, a complaining member should have both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion in proving that there is no rea-
sonable scientific basis for the adopted sanitary measure.193 Under article
2.2, the complaining member should also have the burden of proving that
the challenged measure is not necessary to achieve the defendant member's
selected level of protection.194 In complaints alleging a violation of article
3, the complaining member should have the burden to prove which of the
three options provided in articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 applies and has been
violated. 195 This allocation of burdens is consistent not only with the gen-
189. See Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 13.
190. For example, the report of the Appellate Body in the woven wool shirts case
stated, somewhat ambiguously:
[Ilt is a generally-accepted canon of evidence.., that the burden of proof rests
upon the party... who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence.
If that party adduces evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is
true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.
Id. What is unclear from this decision is whether the burden that "shifts" is merely a
burden to produce additional evidence (and if so how much is needed to "rebut a pre-
sumption"), or whether the burden of persuasion also "shifts" to the defending party
(who now must lose if the total evidence is in "equipoise").
191. Cf. KAzAzI, supra note 169, at 119-51, 223, 357-59 (discussing duty of collabora-
tion of parties to international proceedings, including the duty to provide explanations
and documents that may be in a party's sole possession).
192. As the Appellate Body held in the context of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, when interpreting "'carefully negotiated language... which reflects an equally
carefully drawn balance of rights and obligations of Members . . .,' [that balance must
be respected." Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 126, at 16
(quoting from Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, Feb. 25, 1997, WT/DS24/AB/R, at 15).
193. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2; supra Parts L.A, I.B, II.A.
194. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2.2; supra Parts I.B.2, II.A.2.
195. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 3.1-3.3; supra Parts I.C, II.A.2.
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eral principles discussed above, but also with other SPS provisions.196
The roles and responsibilities in the factfinding process that are pro-
posed in this part of the Article would bring about the fair and efficient
resolution of disputes arising under the SPS Agreement and would respect
the sovereign right of members to protect health and life within their terri-
tories. What remains to be examined is how close to this model the WTO
dispute settlement institutions come in practice. For this purpose, the next
part examines the WTO's factfinding process in an actual dispute.
III. Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Proceeding
Inherent in the reports of the WTO Hormones Panel' 97 and in the Appel-
late Body Report198 are the elements of a general approach to future SPS
disputes. The aspect of this approach relevant to this Article is the Panel's
and Appellate Body's treatment of the issues of scientific uncertainty, sci-
ence policy, and burden of proof. In what follows, I examine their treat-
ment of these issues and evaluate their general approach to SPS dispute
settlement. I conclude that, on a number of important points, when com-
pared to the analysis presented earlier in this Article, the approach taken by
the Panel and the Appellate Body remains unclear or is incorrect.
A. The Proper Substantive Issues Before the Hormones Panel
The first point of comparison is the Panel's and Appellate Body's under-
standing of the content of the findings to be made. The content varies,
depending upon whether the Panel is making findings with respect to risk
assessment or to risk management. My affirmative analyses of risk assess-
ment and risk management, as well as of the content of WTO findings
concerning them, are set forth above, in Parts I and lI.A, respectively.
1. Content of Findings on Risk Assessment Determinations
The definition of "risk assessment" employed by the Hormones Panel
closely follows the conception set forth in the SPS Agreement. 199 More-
over, the Panel found no techniques developed by relevant international
196. SPS article 4.1 expressly places on the exporting (complaining) member the bur-
den of proving that an alternative sanitary measure is as protective as that chosen by the
importing member. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.1. Under SPS article 5.6, the
exporting (complaining) member should have the burden to prove that there exists an
alternative sanitary measure that would achieve the same level of protection selected by
an importing member and that would be significantly less restrictive to trade. See id. art.
5.6.
197. Hormones Panel Report (US), supra note 13; Hormones Panel Report (CAN),
supra note 13.
198. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16.
199. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5, annex A.4; Hormones Panel Report
(CAN), supra note 13, 11 8.95, 8.101 (concluding that a risk assessment for purposes of
the SPS Agreement should "identify the adverse effects on human health" and, if any such
adverse effects exist, should "evaluate the potential or probability of occurrence of these
effects"). The Appellate Body Report expressed a strong preference for not departing
from the sparse language of the SPS Agreement, although it labelled as not "substantially
wrong" the Panel's elaboration of risk assessment as a two-step process that first identi-
fies adverse effects and then identifies their potential for occurrence. Appellate Body
Report, supra note 16, i1 182-84.
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organizations that had to be taken into account in risk assessment.200 Pre-
sumably, therefore, members were free to develop and apply risk assess-
ment techniques "as appropriate to the circumstances," so long as the
challenged sanitary measure was "based on an assessment ... of the risks"
and that assessment of risks incorporated "scientific principles" and con-
tained "sufficient scientific evidence."20 1
The Hormones Panel began by asserting that "it is not for the Panel
itself to conduct its own risk assessment on the basis of scientific evi-
dence."202 This assertion raises the question of what exactly a panel is
supposed to do with respect to risk assessment. I argued above that the
Hormones Panel should have made findings about whether there existed,
at the time of the Panel's proceeding, any reasonable scientific basis for the
European Communities' challenged sanitary measures, and whether the
EC's science-policy choices employed scientifically plausible alterna-
tives.203 However, the Hormones Panel did not follow this approach.
Instead, it developed a two-part, procedural and substantive interpretation
of the "based on" language of SPS article 5.1. This approach led to a
number of serious errors.
For the first part of its interpretation, the Panel found that the require-
ment of SPS article 5.1, that a sanitary measure be "based on an assess-
ment..., of the risks," included a "minimum procedural requirement."20 4
This requirement was that "the Member imposing a sanitary measure
needs to submit evidence that at least it actually took into account a risk
assessment when it enacted or maintained its sanitary measure in order for
that measure to be considered as based on a risk assessment."20 5 For the-
Panel, this requirement meant that the EC had to produce documentation
of a past risk assessment that it had considered when adopting or main-
taining its measures.20 6 Therefore, the Panel required the production of
200. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.106.
201. See SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 5.1, 2.2; see supra Part I.A. The Appellate
Body Report "stress[ed] that Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read together.
Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1 .... " Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 180.
202. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11 8.104, 8.118.
203. See supra Parts I.A, II.A.
204. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.116; SPS Agreement, supra
note 3, art. 5.1.
205. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cl 8.116; see id. 1 8.162; SPS
Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.1.
206. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cTI 8.114, 8.111-8.137. The
Panel did acknowledge that, in the case of "a sanitary measure enacted before the entry
into force of the SPS Agreement," the risk assessment itself might not come into exist-
ence until after the sanitary measure. Id. 1 8.102. In such a case, the risk assessment
would show that the measure was maintained in compliance with the Agreement.
The Panel routinely used the phrase "a risk assessment," which provides grammatical
encouragement for reifying the risk assessment as a physical document. This noun
phrase introduced by an indefinite article, however, is not used in the SPS Agreement.
The closest counterpart appears to be in article 5.1, which refers to "an assessment, as
appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks." SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.1.
But this latter phrasing could easily refer to a line of reasoning or a mode ofjustification,
instead of a document. This would be in keeping with the phrasing of SPS annex A.4,
which defines "risk assessment" as "the evaluation of" the potential for adverse effects.
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one or more risk assessment documents created prior to the panel
proceeding. 20 7
The Appellate Body held that the Panel had created a new procedural
obligation that is not in the SPS Agreement. 20 8 The Appellate Body held
that a member is not required to conduct its own risk assessment, but
could defend its measures by relying on a risk assessment conducted by
another member or by an international organization. 20 9 The Appellate
Body noted, consistent with the argument above, that it would be unwise
and unwarranted to disregard available scientific evidence simply because
it had not been included by the defending member in a prior risk
assessment.
210
In another respect, however, the Appellate Body apparently agreed
with the Hormones Panel that members maintaining sanitary measures
must be able to produce for a panel already completed studies that do con-
stitute an adequate risk assessment. For example, in the case of the hor-
mone MGA, there existed little or no public information at the time of the
Hormones Panel Report. 21 1 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body left undis-
turbed the Panel's finding that there was no risk assessment for MGA, and
held that the European Communities had to produce such a risk assess-
ment.2 12 Thus, although the Appellate Body did not require historical evi-
SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.4. A line of reasoning or mode of justification is
not identical to a physical document. Another possibility is that "risk assessment" is an
ongoing evaluative process. This sense of the term is supported by the grammatical
phrasing of SPS article 5.2 ("In the assessment of risks") and of article 5.3 ("In assessing
the risk"). Id. arts. 5.2, 5.3. Further, annex A.1 to the SPS Agreement lists "methods of
risk assessment" as an example of a sanitary measure that a member might establish,
and annex B.3(c) to the SPS Agreement requires that "one enquiry point" on "risk
assessment procedures" be established by the member - because a member's risk
assessment procedures could themselves be regulatory requirements that are restrictive of
trade. Id. annexes A-1, B.3(c). The SPS Agreement therefore suggests by its language
that "a risk assessment" as a document or procedure should be distinguished from "an
assessment of risks" in the sense of a line of reasoning or a mode of justification. The
Hormones Panel disregarded this linguistic distinction by concluding that the SPS
Agreement requires members to be able to produce a prior document called "a risk
assessment." See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11 8.111-8.114.
207. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, U 8.116-8.119. Although the
Panel occasionally used ambiguous language, its intent seems very clear. The Panel
found that the so-called "'new evidence' gathered by the European Communities during
the Panel process can, therefore, from a procedural point of view, not be considered as
part of a risk assessment on which the European Communities based its measures in
dispute." Id. 1 8.118.
208. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, '1189.
209. Id. 1 190 (stating that a member adopting a sanitary measure need not "have
carried out its own risk assessment," but the measure could have "its objective justifica-
tion in a risk assessment carried out by another Member, or an international
organization").
210. See id. 11 189-90; supra Part II.B.
211. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1I 8.258, 8.264; Appellate
Body Report, supra note 16, '1201.
212. The Appellate Body Report noted that "there was an almost complete absence of
evidence on MGA in the panel proceedings. We therefore uphold the Panel's finding that
there was no risk assessment with regard to MGA." Appellate Body Report, supra note
16, 11c201, 208.
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dence of the EC's past reliance on risk assessment studies, it did require
that such studies exist and be produced in a dispute settlement proceeding.
The Appellate Body therefore approved one aspect of the Panel's procedural
requirement: the defending member must have performed or obtained ade-
quate risk assessment studies prior to the panel's request for them.
In addition, those studies had to be, at least in the hormones dispute,
specifically focused on "the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of the resi-
dues of those hormones found in meat derived from cattle to which the
hormones had been administered for growth promotion purposes.
2 13 It
might be argued that such specificity is not required as a general or proce-
dural matter, but only because the affirmative evidence in the hormones
dispute weighed so overwhelmingly against the EC's position.2 14 Such an
argument is undermined, however, by the sole paragraph devoted to the
adequacy of risk assessment for MGA under article 5.1.215 Although
"there was an almost complete absence of evidence on MGA in the panel
proceedings,"2 16 the studies in the record addressing the carcinogenic
potential of progestins 2 17 were held not to be a risk assessment for MGA
because the EC had not produced "any study that demonstrated how
closely related MGA is chemically and pharmacologically to other proges-
tins and what effects MGA residues would actually have on human beings
when such residues are ingested along with meat from cattle to which MGA
has been administered for growth promotion purposes. '2 18 In view of the
Appellate Body's treatment of MGA, it is reasonable to conclude that mem-
bers who wish to establish or maintain sanitary measures are now obliged
to provide scientific studies that assess the risk posed by specific chemical
213. Id. TI 198-200. According to the Appellate Body, such specificity is required by
annex A.4 to the SPS Agreement (providing the definition of risk assessment). Id. 1 200.
214. See id. TI 192-209. For example, the Appellate Body raised the issue of suffi-
cient specificity when it evaluated the EC's rebuttal evidence concerning risk. Id. 198
(finding that the opinion by Dr. Lucier "does not purport to be the result of scientific
studies carried out by him or under his supervision focusing specifically on residues of
hormones in meat from cattle fattened with such hormones" and thus "is not reasonably
sufficient to overturn the contrary conclusions reached in the scientific studies ... that
related specifically to residues of the hormones in meat from cattle to which hormones
had been administered for growth promotion") (emphasis added).
215. Id. 201.
216. Id.
217. There is evidence in the record that progestins, including progesterone, are pos-
sibly carcinogenic, Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1I 8.129-8.131, and
that the synthetic hormone MGA mimics the biological activity of progesterone. Id.
2.8. See id. 19 4.151-4.171.
218. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 201. This conclusion was consistent
with the general finding of the Appellate Body that:
[t]he 1987 IARC Monographs and the articles and opinions of individual scien-
tists submitted by the European Communities constitute general studies which
do indeed show the existence of a general risk of cancer; but they do not focus
on and do not address the particular kind of risk here at stake - the carcino-
genic or genotoxic potential of the residues of those hormones found in meat
derived from cattle to which the hormones had been administered for growth
promotion purposes....
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agents when used in specific ways. 219
Even the Appellate Body's procedural requirement, however, is an
unreasonable interpretation of the SPS Agreement. Such an interpretation
implies that every sanitary measure existing at the time the SPS Agreement
entered into force suddenly became inconsistent with the Agreement
unless and until someone completed specifically focused studies justifying
the measure. This obligation implies that it is inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement to maintain a domestic regulatory program that automatically
bars import of a new product until the product supplier produces sufficient
data and proves its safety. Such pre-market approval programs impose
bans on products for which there are no specific data, studies, or formal
risk assessment.220
However, the SPS Agreement should not be read to impose on import-
ing members the burden of having complete and specific studies for every
trade-restrictive effect of a sanitary measure. 221 Article 5.1 merely requires
that the measure be "based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circum-
stances, of the risks."222 Pre-market approval programs for untested pesti-
cides or untested food additives can surely be risk-based measures even in
the absence of substance-specific studies.223 What makes such programs
risk-based is the fact that they are designed to address broad categories of
risk: using chemicals that are toxic by design (pesticides) and eating food
additives that have unknown characteristics. Moreover, in the case of
MGA, there is affirmative evidence that MGA mimics a compound with
carci'nogenic potential (progesterone). 224 In cases where such affirmative
evidence exists, the question for the panel should be whether this evidence
constitutes a plausible basis for the conclusion that there is a risk. Thus,
article 5.1 should not be interpreted as creating any procedural require-
ments, even a requirement to conduct or locate risk assessment studies.
The only requirement should be that the challenged measure satisfies the
substantive SPS standards for risk assessment, to which we now turn.
In the second and substantive part of its interpretation, the Panel con-
sidered its task to be one of comparing the scientific conclusions reached
Id. l 200.
219. The Appellate Body grounded this obligation on the SPS Agreement's definition
of "risk assessment" as "the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or
animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs." Id. 1 200 (citing the SPS Agree-
ment, supra note 3, annex A.4).
220. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) and 40 C.F.R. Part 158 (1997) (providing for
pesticide registration); 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 342(a)(1)(C), 348 (1994) and 21 C.F.R. Part
171 (1997) (providing for regulations allowing use of food additives).
221. If the SPS Agreement makes too little provision for a transition period in which
resource-intensive risk assessments could be conducted in a deliberate fashion on a pri-
ority basis without disrupting existing sanitary measures or trade patterns, that problem
should not be exacerbated by holding that the assessment of risks must in all cases be
documented by a report completed prior to the WTO panel proceeding.
222. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.1.
223. See supra note 220.
224. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, TI 2.9, 4.154, 4.161-4.162,
4.164-4.167, 8.129, n.440, 8.131.
Vol. 31
1998 "World Trans-science Organization"
in the relevant risk assessment documents with the scientific conclusions
being asserted by the European Communities in the panel proceeding. The
Panel's goal was to determine whether the EC's assertions were "in con-
formity with any of those reached in the [risk assessment] studies."225
When the Panel found that the EC's conclusion on the safety of the growth-
promoting use of hormones did "not conform to any of the scientific con-
clusions reached" in the studies produced in the Panel proceeding, the
Panel concluded that the EC's sanitary measures were "not based on the
scientific evidence submitted to the Panel."2 26 There are, however, several
serious problems with this approach.
The most obvious difficulty is that it turns the scientists who conduct
risk assessments into the defacto factfinders for the WTO. Consequently,
neither members nor WTO panels would be able to make independent
assessments on the merits. Under the Panel's approach, a member's sani-
tary measures would satisfy article 5.1 only if the member had empaneled
or found a group of scientists who had stated a conclusion consistent with
the position of the member. Moreover, this approach could easily devolve
into a mere procedural formality, with members convening formal meet-
ings of only sympathetic scientists. A panel should instead determine
independently whether there is any reasonable scientific basis for a mem-
ber's risk determinations and sanitary measures. 227 Ceding the factfind-
ing authority of the WTO to past convocations of scientists is a
development that is both inappropriate and too easy to circumvent.
22 8
Moreover, the Panel's interpretation understandably led it to inconsis-
tent conclusions. The Panel appointed six experts to advise it on scientific
matters.229 Although the Panel asserted that it was not its task to conduct
its own risk assessment,2 30 it turned to its expert advisors to help it to
decide both the meaning and the merits of the risk assessment documents
it had before it.2 3 1 Moreover, the Panel itself decided the truth of various
225. Id. cl 8.120; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 192.
226. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1118.140, 8.162.
227. See supra Parts I.A., II.A.
228. Moreover, the Panel's approach would create insoluble and unnecessary ques-
tions about what is to count as a qualifying scientific report. The Hormones Panel
dodged the difficulties in this issue by "assuming" that the documents referred to by the
European Communities met the "minimum requirements of a risk assessment." Hor-
mones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.114. In future disputes the parties might
not be so reasonable. Is a minority report from a scientific conference "a risk assess-
ment"? Is a single co-authored study published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal?
Are there to be minimum WTO requirements for a bona fide "risk assessment process"?
One difficulty with a purely procedural requirement is that we would almost certainly
need substantive criteria for applying it. For example, the Hormones Panel seemed to be
uncertain about what to do with studies that appear to be generally relevant to hormones
but which do not discuss the specific uses at issue in the dispute. See id. 11 8.130,
8.133.
229. See id. 'll 6.9, 8.7-8.9.
230. See id. 1 8.104, 8.118.
231. See id. 1 8.127. The Hormones Panel stated that:
[a]ll of the scientific studies outlined above came to the conclusion that the use
of the hormones at issue (all but MGA, for which no evidence was submitted)
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scientific propositions relevant to the case. 2 32 The reason for this tension
seems clear. A panel cannot merely look at a document reporting the
results of a scientific conference to see whether the report calls itself a "risk
assessment" and what words are used in stating the report's conclusions.
To make its decisions, a panel has to understand the meaning of the asser-
tions made by scientists. The Hormones Panel took the worst approach:
(1) pretend not to pass judgment on the merits of past scientific reports2 33
while implicitly agreeing with their conclusions, and (2) formally preclude
rebuttal explanation in the WTO proceeding by members who disagree
with those scientific reports, saying that WTO panels do not themselves
conduct risk assessments.
The Appellate Body refocused attention on the need to evaluate the
meaning and content of scientific evidence. The Appellate Body held that
the Panel's approach of matching the member's arguments against the con-
clusions found in a risk assessment document might be useful and rele-
vant, but that this was not sufficient to exhaust the meaning of "based on"
a risk assessment.2 34 More is required of a panel than merely matching
documents. In developing its own interpretation of "based on," the Appel-
for growth promotion purposes is safe; .... We note that this conclusion has
also been confirmed by the scientific experts advising the Panel.
See id. '1 8.136 ("[T]he scientific experts advising the Panel were of the view that this
evidence, as it stands today, does not invalidate or contradict the scientific conclusions
reached in the other studies invoked by the European Communities .... ."); id. 1 8.137
("[A]U scientific experts advising the Panel confirmed this conclusion and stated that, as
of today, no scientific evidence is available which concludes that an identifiable risk
arises from the use of any of the hormones at issue for growth promotion purposes in
accordance with good practice."); id. 1 8.114 ("[Tlhe scientists advising the Panel
seemed to consider these reports, from a scientific and technical point of view, to be risk
assessments.").
232. See id. 1 8.137 ("we find that the European Communities has not demonstrated
that the scientific evidence it referred to . . .would indicate that an identifiable risk
arises for human health"); id. '1 8.131-8.132 ("we consider that the 1987 IARC
Monographs... do not contradict, the other studies referred to by the European Com-
munities . . .").
233. The Hormones Panel went to great lengths to appear not to make any scientific
determinations. At one point in its deliberations about the relevance and significance of
several articles and opinions of individual scientists that "deal with the carcinogenic or
genotoxic potential of hormones and criticize the scientific methodology or conclusions
of the other studies referred to by the European Communities," id. 1 8.133, the Panel
rather implausibly concluded:
according to the Codex expert advising the Panel, most of the evidence con-
tained in these articles and opinions and the potential risks addressed therein
were already evaluated and taken into account in the 1988 and 1989 JECFA
Reports. Indeed, in the event these articles and opinions should be considered
as evidence which was ... not "new" but was already taken into account in the
1988 or 1989 JECFA Reports, the Lamming Report or the 1995 EC Scientific
Conference, these articles and opinions would not then invalidate or contradict
the scientific conclusions reached in these other studies ....
Id. 1 8.135 (emphasis added). The Panel retreated to this implausible position (that if a
study was taken into account at a conference, then its results could not be inconsistent
with the findings of the conference) presumably because it was trying to avoid the need
to understand the issues and arguments themselves, and was trying to deal with the
documents only on their face, devoid of meaning.
234. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 193.
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late Body arrived at its own statement of the content of a panel's findings
on risk assessment:
We believe that Article 5.1 ... requires that the results of the risk assessment
must sufficiently warrant - that is to say, reasonably support - the SPS mea-
sure at stake. The requirement that an SPS measure be "based on" a risk
assessment is a substantive requirement that there be a rational relationship
between the measure and the risk assessment.2 35
This search for "reasonable support" implies that a risk assessment docu-
ment need not have reached a "monolithic conclusion" that supports the
member's position; a member might "act in good faith on the basis of what,
at a given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and
respected sources."23 6 What is required is that there be some available
scientific evidence that qualifies as "a risk assessment" and which provides
"sufficient warrant" or "reasonable support" for a member's sanitary
measure.
While the Appellate Body's formulation is much closer to my proposal
than is the Panel's formulation, the Appellate Body's position might still
fall short, depending upon how it is interpreted in future cases. First, the
Appellate Body may require a measure to be reasonably supported by a risk
assessment that is so "specifically focused" that the risk determination
itself must clear a high threshold of specificity. 23 7 In addition, the Appel-
late Body has not sufficiently clarified the roles of scientific uncertainty
and science policy in risk assessment. When there are two plausible scien-
tific accounts and it is uncertain which will prove to be correct, then a
member should be entitled, without further explanation, to base its regula-
tion on either account, as a matter of its own science policy. 238 I have
argued that a member's right to set its own science policy within risk
assessment is guaranteed by the SPS Agreement.2 39 In its careful parsing
of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body overturned some of the more
glaring errors of this particular factfinding panel, but it did not set out
sufficient guidelines on how this issue should be addressed by future
panels.
The Appellate Body's inadequate attention to scientific uncertainty
and science policy is illustrated in its treatment of the concepts of "safety"
and "risk." The Hormones Panel preferred to understand "safety" as an all-
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. 194.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 213-20.
238. 1 have argued that, as a matter of law, the existence of a good-faith controversy
among qualified scientists should constitute compelling evidence of scientific uncer-
tainty and of the scientific plausibility of the competing views. See supra Parts II.A, II.C.
The Appellate Body Report in the hormones dispute acknowledged that such a contro-
versy may indicate or be "a form of" scientific uncertainty, but concluded only that a
member's good-faith reliance on one side of the controversy "does not necessarily signal
the absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assess-
ment." Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11 194. The Appellate Body refrained,
however, from holding that such a controversy should be compelling evidence of uncer-
tainty and plausibility. See id.
239. See supra Part II.A.
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or-nothing scientific issue.240 But most risk assessments today, due to the
presence of scientific uncertainty, are not purely scientific. Risk assessors
must employ science policy in order to complete risk assessments. As
argued above, 241 the assessment of risk with respect to carcinogens nor-
mally involves the pervasive use of science policies to resolve scientific
uncertainties, and those policies reflect risk management policies on what
risk is "safe" or acceptable. 242 The Appellate Body found that the Hor-
mones Panel had no grounds in the SPS Agreement for distinguishing
between risk assessment and risk management, and for relegating policy
decisions exclusively to the latter.243 In keeping with this finding, the
Appellate Body virtually ignored risk management because the phrase is
not mentioned in the SPS Agreement. 244 Thus, the Appellate Body perhaps
left room to locate science policy within the concept of risk assessment,
but it did so in an entirely negative way. This negative approach ignores a
member's sovereign right to establish its own science policy, which derives
its content and rationale from risk management and from the right to select
an appropriate level of protection.245 At a minimum, a panel should iden-
tify and defer to those science-policy choices of the defending member that
result in a scientifically plausible assessment of risk. In most cases, panels
will find that determinations of "safety" are not purely scientific, but are
also based on assumptions made pursuant to science policies.
The Appellate Body also dealt inadequately with the concept of risk.
The Appellate Body corrected the mistaken view of the Hormones Panel
that a risk must be identified or characterized quantitatively by assigning a
probability to the likelihood of occurrence. 246 In addition, the Appellate
Body was rightly concerned that, by substituting the word "probability" for
the word "potential" in the SPS Agreement's definition of "risk assess-
ment, '247 the Panel introduced "a minimum magnitude of risk" as a de
minimis threshold of concern under the SPS Agreement, when the Agree-
240. The Panel stated:
In our view, the scientific conclusion reflected in the EC measures in dispute,
i.e., that the use of the hormones in dispute for growth promotion purposes,
even in accordance with good practice, is not safe, does not conform to any of
the scientific conclusions reached in the evidence referred to by the European
Communities. All the evidence referred to by the European Communities which
specifically relates to the use of the hormones at issue for growth promotion
purposes concludes that the use of these hormones as growth promoters in
accordance with good practice is safe.
Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cl 8.140.
241. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
242. This position was apparently taken by the European Communities. See Hor-
mones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.152.
243. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 181 ("Thus, the Panel's distinction
[between risk assessment and risk management], which it apparently employs to achieve
or support what appears to be a restrictive notion of risk assessment, has no textual
basis [in the SPS Agreement].").
244. Id. 11 181, 206.
245. See supra Parts I.A, I.B, lI.A-
246. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 184.
247. Id.; SPS Agreement, supra note 3, annex A.4.
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ment provides no basis for such a threshold.248 On the other hand, the
Appellate Body found that the kind of risk arising from a merely "theoreti-
cal uncertainty" is not adequate to justify protective measures under the
Agreement.249 Instead, the Appellate Body concluded that there must be a
justification based on an "ascertainable risk," although the methods of
demonstrating its existence need not be "quantitative analysis by the
empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with
the physical sciences."250 But the Appellate Body Report failed to pursue
its own reasoning on this issue far enough.
What is needed is an adequate account of the nature of risk, which
includes an understanding of how scientific uncertainty can itself reflect
risk. The problem is not merely that the phrase "a probability" connotes a
higher degree of likelihood as compared to "a potential" or "a possibility,"
but that the phrase can focus our attention on quantification alone. Risk is
measured not only by positive knowledge of a quantifiable likelihood, but
also by the degree of uncertainty or lack of knowledge about a possible
hazard. Choices made in the face of uncertainty between two plausible
alternatives reflect a true risk. Indeed, the risk taken in acting on such a
choice is directly proportional to the chance of error inherent in any under-
lying prediction. On the continuum between a merely speculative risk and
a conclusively demonstrated one lies a vast stretch of undemonstrated,
unquantified, but scientifically plausible risks. Within that zone, the risk
of harm is real so long as safety is unproven.
A member's right under the SPS Agreement to adopt any level of pro-
tection is also the right to characterize or assess as a real risk any adverse
effect that is "possible," in the sense of "scientifically plausible."251 The
SPS Agreement guarantees the member's right to adopt science policies for
conducting risk assessment in the face of scientific uncertainty, to find that
a scientifically plausible set of assumptions does identify a real risk, and to
choose to protect those individuals within its territory from incurring that
risk. By failing to take into account the important role of science policy in
assessing risk, the Appellate Body also failed to address the right of mem-
bers to find true risks wherever adverse effects are scientifically plausible.
A WTO panel should have no discretion to find a member's measure not
"sufficiently warranted" or not "reasonably supported" by the scientific evi-
dence, if the panel finds that there is at least one scientifically plausible set
of assumptions under which an adverse effect might occur.
2. Content of Findings on Risk Management Determinations
The Hormones Panel apparently began with the same conception of risk
management set forth earlier in this Article.252 The Panel recognized that
248. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11 184-86.
249. See id. 186.
250. See id. IN 186-87.
251. See supra Parts L.A, I.B, IL.A.
252. Compare Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 111 8.98, 8.163, with
supra Part I.B.
Cornell International Law Journal
risk management involves decisions about risk acceptance that are political
and based on non-scientific factors.253 By insisting that risk assessment is
scientific and risk management is value-based, 254 the Panel rejected the
possibility that risk management might set science policies for conducting
risk assessments. The Panel also tended to underestimate the role of sci-
ence in the cost-benefit analyses inherent in management decisions. 255 As
pointed out in the previous part, the Appellate Body virtually ignored the
concept of "risk management" because it is not mentioned in the SPS
Agreement.256 As a result, the Appellate Body Report sheds little or no
light on what should be the appropriate content of WTO findings in con-
nection with risk management.
One example from the hormones dispute illustrates the interaction
between risk management and risk assessment. The example is whether
the sanitary measures of the European Communities were inconsistent
with SPS article 5.5, which proscribes "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinc-
tions in the levels [a Member] considers to be appropriate in different situa-
tions."257 As discussed above, 258 this Agreement provision appears to
require a complicated analysis. However, the Panel and Appellate Body
reports do not dearly indicate which factors are relevant and may be taken
into account, and what standard or priority should be used to balance
those factors.
It is not clear from the Panel's report what factors it considered rele-
vant to deciding whether a difference in levels of protection is "arbitrary or
unjustifiable." For example, the Panel does not clarify the extent to which
different measures could be justified by risk-benefit analyses that take into
account anticipated benefits2 5 9 or consumer perceptions of risk.260 But if
253. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, '1 8.100, 8.163.
254. See, e.g., id. 1 8.97 ("an assessment of risks is... a scientific examination of data
and factual studies; it is not a policy exercise.. ."); id. 1 8.163 ("[Tjhere is a distinction
between risk assessment which is a scientific examination and risk management which
involves social value judgments").
255. The Hormones Panel employed a bright-line distinction between risk assessment
and risk management:
there is a distinction between risk assessment which is a scientific examination
and risk management which involves social value judgments. Once the risks
have been assessed, i.e., once the risks and their probability of occurrence iden-
tified, a Member will need to decide, on the basis of its own value judgments,
whether it can accept these risks. In so doing a Member sets its "appropriate
level of sanitary protection". The determination and application of the appropri-
ate level of protection by a Member is part of risk management.
Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cl 8.163.
256. See supra text accompanying note 244.
257. The Panel found that the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
had yet to develop guidelines to help implement this provision. Hormones Panel Report
(CAN), supra note 13, '1 8.173.
258. See supra Part I.B.1.
259. The relevance of benefits remains unclear. On the one hand, the Panel at times
seemed to consider that the only justification for a difference in levels of protection must
be safety-based. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, JTI 8.216-8.217. On
the other hand, the Panel apparently took into account "that, according to scientific
experts advising the Panel, the hormones at issue ... may also have beneficial effects
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benefits could not be weighed in the balance, or consumer anxieties could
not be respected, or domestic politics could not be taken into account,
what would remain of the sovereignty inherent in risk management deci-
sions? What are the permissible factors and what are the permissible bal-
ances that would justify differences in levels of protection? The Appellate
Body Report is only slightly clearer than the Panel reports. One might infer
from that Report that the nature of the regulatory intervention required
might be used to justify different approaches, 26 1 or that the administrative
difficulty and the cost of control might constitute a justification,2 62 or that
information about benefits as well as about risks might be relevant to a
justification.2 63 Such inferences from the Appellate Body's Report would
be indirect, however, and would undoubtedly be subject to revision in
future cases.2 64 Therefore, we are left with little guidance on relevant fac-
(such as improved composition of the carcass upon treatment in terms of more lean
meat and less fat)." Id. 1 8.235.
260. Canada argued against the measures of the European Communities in part
because "the EC ban causing the distinction in levels of protection is based on additional
factors not relevant to the protection of health (such as ... meeting consumer anxieties
and expectations.. .)." Id. 1 8.242. The Panel apparently thought that "consumer pref-
erences" are irrelevant in risk assessment. Id. 1 8.108. The SPS Agreement itself, how-
ever, is clear in regarding the voluntariness of exposure as a factor relevant to justifying a
difference in levels of protection. SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.5. The justifying
role of consumer perceptions or anxieties remains remarkably unclear in the Panel
Report. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1118.181, 8.192, 8.216,
8.232-8.241.
261. The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's conclusion that the difference in
the EC's levels of protection between "added hormones in treated meat" ("no-residue")
and "naturally-occurring hormones in food" ("unlimited-residue") was arbitrary and
unjustifiable. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 221. The Appellate Body found a
"fundamental distinction" between added and naturally-occurring hormones, and
stated with respect to naturally-occurring hormones that:
the European Communities simply takes no regulatory action; to require it to
prohibit totally the production and consumption of such foods or to limit the
residues of naturally-occurring hormones in food, entails such a comprehensive
and massive governmental intervention in nature and in the ordinary lives of
people as to reduce the comparison itself to an absurdity.
Id.
262. See id. IN 222-25 (concluding that the difference in the EC's levels of protection
between hormones used for growth promotion and hormones used for therapeutic and
zootechnical purposes was not "in itself' arbitrary or unjustifiable).
263. See id. TI 226-35 (agreeing with the Panel's conclusion that the difference in the
EC's levels of protection between hormones used for growth promotion and the anti-
microbial agents carbadox and olaquindox was unjustifiable under SPS article 5.5, but
reaching this conclusion after considering arguments about therapeutic benefits and
equally useful available alternatives to carbadox or olaquindox).
264. In a different but related context, the Appellate Body cited consumer anxieties in
Europe in reversing the Panel's finding that the unjustifiable difference in the EC levels
of protection between hormones used for growth purposes and the anti-microbial agents
carbadox and olaquindox resulted in a hormone measure that constitutes "discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on international trade" inconsistent with SPS article 5.5.
Id. 11 242-46; SPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 5.5. The Appellate Body Report recites
that the documentation surrounding the EC's adoption of its hormones measures:
makes clear the depth and extent of the anxieties experienced by the European
Communities concerning the results of the general scientific studies (showing
the carcinogenicity of hormones), the dangers of abuse (highlighted by scandals
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tors and no standard by which to balance competing factors.
Fortunately, it is not the objective of this Article to sort out a theory of
justifiable inconsistency, but to focus on the roles of scientific uncertainty
and science policy in risk management, and on the nature of WTO
facifinding concerning them. The task of comparing the risks posed by
two different compounds illustrates the problems. Canada argued, for
example, that the risks from the use of carbadox (an anti-microbial agent
allowed by the EC as a feed additive in swine production) were at least as
serious as those posed by the hormones in dispute, because carbadox is
carcinogenic and mutagenic.265 The EC contended, among other things,
that there was no risk under either regulatory regime because carbadox is
used only in small quantities and is hardly absorbed, so that it leaves no
residues in meat destined for human consumption.266 The Panel relied
upon the advice of its experts in making factual findings against the Euro-
pean Communities on this question of the extent of the risk.2 67 Although
relating to black-marketing and smuggling of prohibited veterinary drugs in the
European Communities) of hormones and other substances used for growth
promotion and the intense concern of consumers within the European Commu-
nities over the quality and the drug-free character of the meat available in its
internal market.
Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 245. The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's
apparent conclusion that the EC hormone measures "were not really designed to protect
its population from the risk of cancer." Id. The Appellate Body held that the Panel's
finding of "discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade" was errone-
ous as a matter of law. Id.
Two things are noteworthy about the Appellate Body's reasoning. The first is that it
was based on consumer anxiety about the risk of cancer, not on the risk of cancer itself.
The Appellate Body had already upheld the Panel's finding that there was no adequate
risk assessment to warrant the EC's hormone measures. Id. 1 208. Surely a docu-
mented risk of cancer would have been sufficient. But under SPS article 5.5, in the
context of a member's objective or purpose in adopting a measure, consumer anxiety
and actual risk are both relevant.
The second noteworthy feature is that consumer anxiety is apparently highly relevant
in determining whether a measure is a "disguised restriction on international trade," but
not in determining whether a difference in levels of protection is "arbitrary or unjustifi-
able." With respect to the difference in the EC levels of protection between growth pro-
motion hormone use and use of carbadox and olaquindox, the Appellate Body upheld
the Panel on the latter issue, prior to reversing it on the former. Compare id. a 235, with
id. 1246. Yet these documented consumer anxieties seemed to play no role in the Appel-
late Body's reasoning on whether the difference in level of protection was justifiable.
The regime now in place as a result of this case appears to be that even if an adequate
risk assessment is not available, unjustifiable differences in levels of protection may be
consistent with article 5.5 of the Agreement if the member has acted out of concern for
consumer anxiety. Id. 1 208, 246. Such a curious result will likely be addressed in
future cases.
265. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cTcl 8.228, 8.231-8.232, 8.236,
8.238-8.239, 4.226-4.275; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 226.
266. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11 8.228, 8.231-8.232, 8.236,
8.238-8.239, 4.226-4.275; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, CI 230, 232-233.
267. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.236 ("The experts
also stated that additives in feedstuffs pose additional risks in that they may harm the
persons handling the feedstuff."); id. 8.238 ("[Alccording to the experts advising the
Panel, there is no guarantee that the piglets treated with carbadox will not be slaugh-
tered."); id. cl 8.239 ("[Alccording to the experts advising the Panel, once a substance has
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the Panel wished to claim that it was not itself engaging in the assessment
of risks, it is not plausible that a panel can avoid doing so in such a case.
Comparisons between risks posed by different compounds or by different
regulatory measures are bound to be raised for the first time before WTO
panels, without prior scientific meetings to address those precise issues. It
is unreasonable to suggest that WTO panels can make comparisons with-
out actually assessing the risks of the compounds or measures being com-
pared. In the hormones dispute, the Appellate Body Report clearly
condoned the Panel's factfinding concerning risk,2 68 and it is hard to see
how the Appellate Body could not do so.
Moreover, future comparisons are likely to be far more complicated
and far more uncertain than in the hormones dispute.26 9 For example,
WTO panels may be called upon to decide whether carcinogenicity data
showing only liver tumor effects in laboratory mice should be considered
as evidencing a risk comparable to that posed by a compound with data
showing tumor effects in multiple organs and two species.270 In the hor-
mones dispute, the Panel probably believed that it would be relatively sim-
ple to make findings of fact about exposure and comparative risk in that
context.27 1 However, the Panel misperceived the implications of its under-
taking. Although panels should not themselves conduct formal risk assess-
ments, they are called upon to determine whether the science-policy
choices of a member are scientifically plausible, in light of the scientific
uncertainty present in the factual issues. Such findings are appropriate
and necessary not only within the confines of risk assessment, but also
with regard to the decision-making process that is essential to risk
management.
been administered to an animal there will always be some residue level of this substance
or a metabolite left, albeit a very small one, in the meat of that animal.").
268. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11 220-35. For example, the Appellate
Body noted and apparently relied upon the fact that the experts advising the Panel con-
firmed that carbadox is genotoxic, id. '1 226, the Panel's conclusion that the use of
carbadox "poses additional risks since it may harm the persons handling the feedstuff,"
id. 1 230, and the Panel's statement "that, according to the experts advising it, once a
substance has been administered to an animal, there will always be some residue of this
substance or a metabolite ... in the meat of that animal," id. 1 233.
269. Cf. Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 88, at 1865-79 (discussing conceptual diffi-
culties with comparative risk assessment, especially in context of scientific uncertainty).
270. This example has been chosen as illustrative of the role of science policy. See
supra Part I.A.2.
271. The Hormones Panel also decided to rely upon the factual advice of its experts at
other places within the Panel's review of the risk management decisions of the European
Communities. See, e.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.190 ("[A]ll
scientific experts advising the Panel have concluded that residues of the three natural
hormones present endogenously in meat and other foods or administered for therapeu-
tic or zootechnical purposes are qualitatively the same as the residues of these hormones
administered for growth promotion ...."); id. 1 8.202 ("[Aiccording to scientific experts
advising the Panel, zootechnical use of these hormones can occur on a large scale and at
regular intervals, namely each year for oestrus synchronization of entire herds.").
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B. The Evidence Properly Available to the Hormones Panel
The Hormones Panel exhibited an ambivalence about what evidence it
should consider. On the one hand, the Panel allowed the parties to submit
written scientific evidence. 2 72 But insofar as that evidence was "new evi-
dence" produced before the Panel but not taken into account in any already
completed risk assessment document, the Panel did not consider it as meet-
ing the Panel's procedural and substantive requirements for a risk assess-
ment under SPS article 5.1.273 The Panel considered this position to be
consistent with its view that it had no mandate to conduct its own risk
assessment. 27 4 Moreover, when the European Communities requested that
the Panel consider the studies and other relevant data that Canada and the
United States had used to approve the use of the hormones, the Panel "did
not consider this information to be relevant to address the EC measures in
dispute. '2 75 Nevertheless, as noted above, the Panel at various times based
its findings of fact in part upon the opinions and information provided by
its own experts. 2 76
The Appellate Body's position on this issue is not entirely clear,
although its position is different than that of the Panel. The Appellate Body
rejected the Panel's "minimum procedural requirement" under article
5.1,277 and in so doing expressed concern that such a requirement "could
well lead to the elimination or disregard of available scientific evidence that
rationally supports the SPS measure being examined." 278 Moreover, in
reviewing the evidence in the record to determine whether there was rea-
sonable scientific support for the EC measures, the Appellate Body Report
did not distinguish between older evidence and "new evidence" produced
in the context of the Panel proceeding.2 79 One can infer, therefore, that
"new evidence" produced for the first time in a panel proceeding can be
used to find a plausible scientific basis for a member's SPS measures.
Finally, the Panel was attempting an impossible task - making deter-
minations about risk assessment documents without actually understand-
ing or taking a position on risk assessment issues.28 0 There are sound
policy reasons why WTO panels should make independent findings about
the merits of risk assessments. The Hormones Panel should have used all
of the relevant scientific information made available to it by the parties and
by its own appointed experts, but should have used it for the limited pur-
pose of finding whether there was any reasonable scientific basis for the
risk determinations of the European Communities.
272. Id. 1 8.10.
273. Id. 8.118.
274. Id.
275. Id. 1 8.11; Hormones Panel Report (US), supra note 13, 11 8.11.
276. See supra notes 231, 267, 271.
277. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, TI 188-91.
278. Id. l 190.
279. See id. 11 192-209; Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, [cTI 8.111,
8.118, 8.133-8.136.
280. See supra Part III.A.1.
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C. The Standard and Burden of Proof Employed by the Panel
The Panel surely employed some standard of proof in reaching its findings
of fact, but that standard is not explained in its report. The Panel made
findings about the weight of evidence produced by the parties.2 81 More-
over, the Panel in a number of instances relied upon the advice of its
experts and made findings of fact.28 2 But the Panel did not state the stan-
dard of proof it employed. 28 3 The Panel did not address the question,
"How probative or convincing does the evidence have to be in order to
warrant a finding in favor of a proponent on any factual issue?"
The Appellate Body Report also provided no direct answer to the ques-
tion. The Appellate Body discussed the appropriate "standard of review"
for a WTO panel to use in reviewing a member's acts, determinations, or
evidence. 28 4 It pointed out that neither the SPS Agreement, the DSU, nor
any covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement)
prescribes a particular standard of review. 285 Therefore, neither a panel
nor the Appellate Body is authorized to adopt a standard of review that
might change the "finely drawn balance" of the Agreement. 28 6 However,
Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to make "an objective assessment of
the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the
case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered
agreements .... *"287 This "duty to make an objective assessment of the
facts" was interpreted by the Appellate Body as a duty of "objectivity" in the
281. E.g., Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.149 ("[W]e note that the
European Communities has not provided convincing evidence that the control... of the
hormones in dispute is more difficult than the control of other veterinary drugs the use
of which it allows.").
282. See supra Parts Il.A, III.B. An extraordinary example is provided by the finding
in the Hormones Panel Report:
Addressing the fourth EC argument that there are no alternatives to carbadox or
olaquindox available which have the same therapeutic action, we note that one of
the experts advising the Panel stated that there are readily available alternatives,
such as oxytetracycline. We thus find that this EC argument does not justify the
distinction in levels of protection for the five hormones at issue when used as
growth promoters and carbadox or olaquindox.
Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.237 (emphasis added). Whether this
finding is viewed as being about the comparative therapeutic effects of alternative treat-
ments or about the economic availability of market substitutes or about the weight of a
cost-benefit justification for alternative regulatory measures, it is remarkable for its slim
evidentiary basis and for what it shows about the nature of the subtle but important
factfinding implicit in these WTO panel reports.
283. I argued above that a panel should make its findings by a preponderance of all
the evidence. See supra Part II.C. At least the Panel seemed to be of the view that "sci-
ence can never provide a certainty, i.e. exclude once and for all that a specific substance
can ever have adverse health effects." See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13,
1 8.155.
284. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 110-19.
285. Id. [ 114; see also Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 Am. J. INr'L L. 193, 199
(1996) (noting that no provisions in the DSU explicitly concern the "standard of review"
as such).
286. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 1 115. See id. 117.
287. Id. 1 116; DSU, supra note 7, art. 11.
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sense of "good faith."288 This duty requires a panel to consider the evi-
dence presented, to make its factual findings on the basis of that evidence,
and to afford the party submitting the evidence "fundamental fairness, or
what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or natural jus-
tice."28 9 The Appellate Body cannot reverse a factual determination of a
panel merely because there has been an error of judgment in the apprecia-
tion of evidence, 290 but only if there has been "an egregious error that calls
into question the good faith of a panel."291
This discussion by the Appellate Body, however, does not answer the
question presented here. How probative or convincing does the propo-
nent's evidence have to be in order to warrant or compel a finding of fact in
the proponent's favor? It is no answer to say that a panel should consider
the evidence "objectively" and in good faith. Nor is it responsive to add
that it is generally within a panel's discretion both to decide which evi-
dence to rely upon in making findings 292 and to determine the credibility
and weight properly to be ascribed to a given piece of evidence. 293 The
proper standard of proof should be a matter of law binding upon all
panels, not decided by individual panels on a case-by-case or issue-by-issue
basis. I have argued elsewhere that the preponderance standard of proof is
the standard that creates an incentive for parties on both sides of an issue
to produce adequate evidence, and that this standard treats all parties in an
unbiased fashion.294 It is possible to interpret "an objective assessment of
the facts" as encompassing both of these policy objectives, and as imposing
upon panels an obligation to make findings in accordance with the prepon-
derance of the evidence. Neither the Hormones Panel nor the Appellate
Body has chosen this interpretation, however, and so it appears that future
panels are free to find facts by a preponderance of the evidence or by some
higher or lower standard.
There is some indication, however, that the Appellate Body is open to
developing an enforceable notion of the minimal evidentiary support
needed for a panel's findings. It should be inconsistent with "an objective
assessment of the facts" to make a finding when the panel record does not
contain that minimum of evidence which any reasonable person would
consider necessary to support such a finding.295 For example, the Appel-
late Body reversed the Panel's finding that the EC's different levels of pro-
tection for the growth-promotion use of hormones and the anti-microbial
288. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, cl 133.
289. Id.
290. The DSU limits appellate review to "issues of law covered in the panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the panel." DSU, supra note 7, art. 17.6. See also
Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 132 ("Findings of fact, as distinguished from
legal interpretations or legal conclusions, by a panel are, in principle, not subject to
review by the Appellate Body.").
291. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, cl 133.
292. Id. 135.
293. Id. 132.
294. Walker, supra note 169, at 1113-20.
295. For the discussion of the requirement of minimal rational support, see supra Part
I.C.
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use of carbadox and olaquindox resulted in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. 296 Part of the basis for this reversal was
that, even if a difference in levels of protection is unjustifiable, the mere
degree of difference between a "no residue" level and an "unlimited resi-
due" level is not sufficient evidence to support such a finding.297 The
remainder of the evidence was likewise insufficient to support the Panel's
finding.298 Thus, the Appellate Body held that the Panel's finding was
erroneous as a matter of law.299 Under its authority to interpret the DSU
("objective assessment") and to interpret specific provisions of covered
agreements, the Appellate Body has the authority and should have the
responsibility to determine whether a panel's evidence provided the neces-
sary rational support for its findings.
The allocation of the burdens of production and of persuasion are
extremely important in a case like the growth hormones dispute, where
there may be significant scientific uncertainty about carcinogenic risk.
Especially where the factual issue is posed as a yes-or-no question of
whether the relevant residues are "safe" or "unsafe," the party with the bur-
den of persuasion has a difficult burden of proof, even under a preponder-
ance standard.300 The reason is that in all likelihood no one knows for
certain whether the residues are safe or unsafe, and there is some differ-
ence of scientific opinion on whether the residues are probably safe. How-
ever, with certain assumptions and models risk assessors can make
plausible scientific estimates of the risk and can explain the uncertainties
inherent in those estimates. A factfinding panel is understandably tempted
to resolve its most difficult factual issues by assigning the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion.301
The Panel correctly found that the initial burden rests on the com-
plaining party to present a prima facie case of an inconsistency between a
sanitary measure and the SPS Agreement.30 2 It also correctly interpreted a
"primafacie case" as being "factual and legal arguments that, if unrebutted,
would demonstrate a violation of the SPS Agreement." 30 3 The Appellate
Body took a slightly different approach in defining a "prima facie case' as
296. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11 236-46.
297. Id. t 240.
298. Id. l 246.
299. Id.
300. A qualitative, yes-or-no question of "safety" is probably not the best way to frame
the issue, however. What is needed is a more tractable series of issues, with a clear
allocation of burdens of production and persuasion under each. Then a panel could
determine the extent of scientific uncertainty under each issue and sub-issue, as well as
the scientific plausibility of the science-policy choices made by members.
301. For an illustration, see the Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11
8.237, quoted in its entirety supra note 282. One reason that seemed to warrant making
this finding on such a slim evidentiary basis was that the Panel had placed the burden of
providing a justification on the European Communities, id. c 8.241, and had found that
the European Communities had "not submitted scientific evidence in support of these
alleged justifications," id. '1 8.233.
302. Id. c 8.54; Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 98.
303. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, J 8.54.
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"one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party,
requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favor of the complaining
party presenting the prima facie case."'304 The difference between the two
notions is subtle but important, and involves the role of the Appellate
Body.
Under the Panel's definition, a panel might find as a matter of fact that
it considers the evidence presented to be sufficiently weighty, so that in the
absence of contrary evidence it would find for the complaining party. On
this view, calling the presented evidence a "primafacie case" merely means
that the factfinder considers it convincing, at least as an initial matter and
ignoring any rebuttal evidence. Under the Appellate Body's definition,
however, a complaining party's evidence does not constitute a prima facie
case unless it is so compelling that the factfinder has no authority to rule
against it in the absence of contrary evidence. On this latter view, an unre-
butted prima facie case entitles the Appellate Body to reverse a panel that
finds against the complaining party. Presumably, evidence that is merely
persuasive to the panel, but which is not so compelling as to authorize
Appellate Body reversal, is not a prima facie case. A true prima facie case
creates a rebuttable presumption for the complaining party that is enforce-
able by the Appellate Body.
This difference in definition may be subtle, but the procedural implica-
tions can be extremely important. Under the Panel's definition, calling the
evidence presented a prima facie case is nothing more than an announce-
ment that the panel finds that evidence persuasive if it remains unrebutted.
Doing so informs the defending party that the plaintiffs evidence appears
strong, and that the defendant would be well advised to produce contrary
evidence. Under the Appellate Body's definition, however, it can be said
that a prima facie case shifts a true burden of production to the defending
party. Absent rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff should prevail as a matter of
law. I have argued above30 5 for a burden of production and a definition of
prima facie case intermediate to those of the Hormones Panel and of the
Appellate Body. A complaining party should have to produce the mini-
mally sufficient evidence needed to sustain a finding in its favor, and such
sufficiency would be subject to Appellate Body review. The complaining
party, however, should not have to produce evidence so strong as to com-
pel such a finding as a matter of law. Under my approach, a prima facie
case would in fact be persuasive to the panel, but would not in itself shift a
burden of production to the defendant. The defendant would therefore be
entitled to rely merely on argument to dissuade the panel from finding for
the complaining party.
The choice among the three definitions may influence whether the
defending member has a burden of production, but the choice should
make no difference in the allocation of the burden of persuasion. The Panel
incorrectly found that once such a primafacie case has been presented, the
304. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 104.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 184-91.
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burden of persuasion shifts to the defending party.30 6 The Appellate Body
Report is more ambiguous about which burden shifts.30 7 I have argued
above, 30 8 however, that if both parties produce minimally sufficient evi-
dence for their allegations, a panel should weigh all the evidence and make
findings in accordance with the preponderance of that evidence. In weigh-
ing all the evidence, a panel should still follow the default rule that the
complaining party has the burden of persuasion. If a panel finds equally
weighty evidence for and against an inconsistency with the Agreement, it
should enter a finding against the complaining party. This is because an
inconsistency has not been proved simply by the presentation of a prima
facie case; if rebuttal evidence is produced, an inconsistency has not been
proved unless the complaining party's evidence is more probative and con-
vincing than the defending party's evidence.
Several examples from the hormones dispute illustrate the importance
of how the burden of persuasion is allocated. The first involves the harmo-
nization provisions of article 3. The Panel concluded that once a com-
plaining party provides a prima facie case to demonstrate that a relevant
international standard exists and that the measure in dispute does not con-
form to it,30 9 then the defending party must prove that its measure meets
306. As the Panel stated: "... Canada bears the burden of presenting a prima facie
case of inconsistency with the SPS Agreement, after which the burden of proof shifts to
the European Communities to demonstrate that its measures in dispute meet the
requirements imposed by the SPS Agreement." Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra
note 13, 1 8.58.
It does make sense to say, however, that as a tactical matter, once a prima facie case
has been produced by the complaining party, the defending party would be well advised
to produce rebuttal evidence, because otherwise the unrebutted primafacie evidence will
probably carry the day. See supra Part II.C; Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts, supra note 126, at 16-17 (once India had put forward a prima facie case to
demonstrate that a U.S. measure was inconsistent with the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing, the United States risked an adverse finding by default if it failed to bring for-
ward evidence sufficient to disprove India's claim).
307. The Appellate Body Report stated: "When that prima facie case is made, the
burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the
claimed inconsistency [with the SPS Agreement]." Appellate Body Report, supra note 16,
1 98. The problem comes in specifying the meaning of "counter" and "refute." If these
words merely mean "produce the minimum weight of evidence needed to warrant a find-
ing in its favor," then all that shifts is a burden of production. If, however, these words
mean "produce evidence whose probative value outweighs that produced by the com-
plaining party," then the defending party would have the burden of persuading the panel
that no violation in fact occurred. The Appellate Body Report also noted that: "Only
after such a prima facie determination had been made by the Panel may the onus be
shifted to the European Communities to bring forward evidence and arguments to prove
the complaining parties claim." Id. 1 109. This statement contains the same ambigui-
ties in the words "bring forward... to prove .... There would seem to be no justifica-
tion at all for shifting to the defendant an even weightier burden than proving by a
preponderance - namely, the burden of producing evidence so compelling that the
panel must find in the defendant's favor as a matter of law.
308. See supra Part II.C.
309. The Panel identified the "conform to" language of SPS article 3.2 with the "based
on" language of SPS article 3.1, and afforded the same presumptions created in favor of
conforming measures also to measures that are based on international standards. See SPS
Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 3.1, 3.2; Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 11
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the provisions of SPS article 3.3.310 The Panel also interpreted both condi-
tions under SPS article 3.3 as requiring compliance with the risk assess-
ment and risk management provisions of SPS article 5.311 As a result, the
Panel found that, in such a case, the defending party bears the burdens of
production and persuasion in proving that the measure complies with the
relevant article 5 provisions. 3 12 Once the Panel found, therefore, that the
measures of the European Communities did not conform to existing inter-
national standards,3 13 it shifted the burden of persuasion to the European
Communities to prove compliance with SPS article 5.314
8.89 ("Article 3.2 ... specifies that the complaining party has the burden of overcoming
a presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement in the case of a measure based on
international standards.") (emphasis added); Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11
162. Such a collapse of SPS articles 3.2 and 3.1 is inappropriate. See supra Part I.C.
310. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 8.90. The Panel interpreted SPS
article 3.1 as imposing a general obligation on all members to base all sanitary measures
on international standards, guidelines and recommendations (when such standards,
guidelines and recommendations exist), and SPS article 3.3 as providing an exception to
that general obligation. Id. 8.89. Reading SPS article 3.3 as an exception to article 3.1
is inappropriate. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 172.
311. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, cl 8.86. 1 argued above that this
collapse of the two alternative conditions of SPS article 3.3 is unnecessary. See supra
Part I.C.
312. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 71 8.92-8.93.
313. This part of the Panel's reasoning is also puzzling. The Panel found that the
European Communities' measures represented a level of protection "significantly differ-
ent from the level of protection set by the Codex standards" and were therefore not
"based on" existing international standards. Id. UI 8.78-8.80. The Panel then made the
peculiar statement that "[flor purposes of our analysis under Article 3.3, we assume that
the former level [the level of protection of the European Communities] is higher than the
latter [the Codex level]." Id. 7 8.83. Why should the Panel "assume" this to be true
rather than find it to be true?
Perhaps this anomaly is explained by the fact that the complaining members were in
effect claiming that the level of protection of the European Communities was not higher
than that provided by the Codex recommendations. If the dispute is conceptualized in
terms of "safety," then the complaining parties were in effect claiming that the Codex
standards were "safe" and that the measures of the European Communities were no
safer. But in that case, why would the measures not be "based on" or not "conform to"
the international guidelines? The Panel elsewhere seemed to agree with its expert advi-
sors that:
the fact that ADIs and MRLs exist for zeranol and trenbolone and not for the
natural hormones does not.., per se mean that the latter are inherently safer
than the former since the international standards for both synthetic and natural
hormones reflect essentially the same level of protection, namely a "no apprecia-
ble risk" level.
Id. 8.216.
The reasonable solution may be that SPS article 3.3 should not have applied at all, and
that the dispute should have been resolved under SPS article 2.2 (a measure must be
applied "only to the extent necessary to protect human ... health") and SPS article 5.6
(measures should be "not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropri-
ate level of sanitary ... protection"). SPS Agreement, supra note 3, arts. 2.2, 3.3, 5.6.
.But if that is so, then the entire analysis of the Panel was largely misdirected. See Hor-
mones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, q 8.274 (further findings under SPS art. 2
unnecessary); id. q 8.250 (findings under SPS art. 5.6 unnecessary). Additionally, the
burden of proof analysis of SPS articles 3.1 and 3.3 was gratuitous.
314. Remarkably, even in the case of the hormone MGA, for which there was no inter-
national standard, the Panel shifted the burden of persuasion to the European Commu-
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The Appellate Body explicitly found that the Panel erred when it col-
lapsed the concepts of "conform to" (article 3.2) and "based on" (article
3.1), and held that the SPS Agreement did not impose on members a basic
obligation to conform domestic sanitary measures to Codex standards,
guidelines and recommendations. 3 15 However, if proof of a lack of con-
formity is no longer a prima facie case, then what showing by a com-
plaining party is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption that the
challenged measures are inconsistent with the Agreement? In the case of
the five hormones where Codex standards existed, the Appellate Body
assumed that the EC measures were not "based on" Codex standards and
that they resulted in a higher level of protection than the Codex standards
would provide.3 16 Therefore, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that
the challenged measures fell under article 3.3 and that the European Com-
munities had an obligation to comply with the risk assessment require-
ment of article 5.1.317
The initial burdens of production and persuasion concerning a viola-
tion of article 5.1 remained on the United States and Canada.3 18 The
Appellate Body found, however, that these parties had in fact produced a
prima facie case that the EC measures were not based on a risk assess-
ment.3 19 The Appellate Body reached this conclusion after reviewing the
proffered evidence on its merits.320 Although it is not at all clear what
generalizable rule might be inferred from this treatment, the Appellate
Body seemed to be persuaded by the Panel's finding that "[a]ll of the scien-
tific studies" that specifically addressed the issue concluded that the use of
the hormones for growth purposes is "safe," as well as by the lack of speci-
ficity in the contrary scientific evidence. 3 2 1 Presumably, given the Appel-
late Body's definition of "prima facie case," the evidence produced by the
United States and Canada was so compelling that it entitled them to a find-
ing that the measures were inconsistent with the Agreement as a matter of
law, in the absence of "effective refutation" by the EC. 322 Throughout this
battle, the evidence remained the same, but the burden of persuasion
played an important role in the outcome.
In a second example bearing on risk assessment, the shifted burden of
persuasion affected factfinding under the Panel's substantive requirements
for risk assessment under article 5.1.323 The Panel found that the Euro-
pean Communities had "the burden of proving the existence of a risk
nities. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.256 (prima facie case of
violation under SPS article 5.1-5.3, dealing with risk assessment); id. 1 8.266 (prima
fade case of violation under SPS article 5.5, dealing with differences in levels of
protection).
315. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 11163-66.
316. Id. 1 174.
317. Id. 1 176-77.
318. Id. 1 197 n.180.
319. Id.
320. See id. T1 195-200.
321. See id. 11 196-200; see supra text accompanying notes 213-20.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 302-07.
323. See supra Part II.A.1.
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assessment (and, derived therefrom, an identifiable risk)" on which the
EC's measures were based.324 Under the Panel's interpretation, the EC had
the burden of proving that the scientific conclusion about risk reflected in
the EC's measures was in conformity with any of those reached in the stud-
ies referred to by the EC.325 Thus, the Panel's factfinding deliberations
were reduced largely to a hunt for eligible scientific quotations about
"safety,"326 and produced the inconsistencies discussed earlier. 327
Although the Appellate Body rejected the Panel's interpretation of article
5.1 and its approach to burden shifting,328 the Appellate Body still found a
prima facie case in the panel record 329 and arguably shifted to the EC the
burden of persuasion in "refuting" that prima facie case.330 It is possible
therefore that the EC had the difficult task of persuading the WTO that its
evidence was sufficiently specific and probative so as to overcome a pre-
sumption of no risk.331 In view of the lack of standards for what consti-
tutes "specifically focused" evidence, this was a substantial burden
indeed.332
As a final example, in the area of risk management, the Panel found
that the European Communities had the burden of proving that the selec-
tion and implementation of its appropriate level of protection was consis-
tent with SPS article 5.5.333 This placed on the European Communities the
tasks of persuading the Panel as to the comparative risk posed by different
regulatory measures 334 and of persuading the Panel that some risk/benefit
analysis "justified" the choice among different regulatory measures. 335 In
this area, where the issues and relevant factors are entirely unclear,336 this
is a substantial burden. The burden on the defending party, together with
the vagueness of the task, helps to explain the finding of the Hormones
Panel against the EC.33 7 Although the Appellate Body reversed this find-
324. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.154.
325. Id. 8.162, 8.120. 1 have already argued that the Panel misconceived the con-
tent of the findings it was supposed to make, and that the Panel should have made
findings about whether there was any reasonable scientific basis for the risk assessment
conclusions reached by the European Communities. See supra Part III.A. Here, however,
I consider only the effect of the Panel's allocation of the burden of persuasion on the
Panel's factfinding process.
326. See Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, [ 8.122-8.140.
327. See supra Part III.A.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 234-36.
329. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 197 n.180.
330. Although the Appellate Body's position on this issue is ambiguous, see supra note
307 and accompanying text, the Appellate Body certainly placed a heavy burden of
some kind on the EC. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
331. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 104 ("[A] prima facie case is one
which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as
a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie
case."); supra text accompanying notes 211-19.
332. See id.
333. Hormones Panel Report (CAN), supra note 13, 1 8.168.
334. See, e.g., id. 1 8.196.
335. See, e.g., id. 8.200.
336. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.A.2, III.A.2.
337. See Hormones Panel Report, supra note 13, 1 8.247.
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ing, 338 it did so by reviewing the interpretations, arguments and evidence
relevant to the issue, and the issue of burden of persuasion did not play a
significant role.339 The Appellate Body has held, however, that the initial
burden of proof under article 5.5 is on the complaining party.3 40 Nonethe-
less, given the vagueness of the relevant standards,341 the burden of per-
suasion may play a more determining role in future dispute settlement
proceedings.
Conclusion
The confusion of the Hormones Panel and the errors it made are under-
standable in light of the complexity of the factual evidence, the difficulty of
the numerous legal issues of first impression, and the time constraints on
its proceedings. Although the Appellate Body Report correctly resolved
certain errors committed by the Panel, it left other errors uncorrected and
failed to clarify many other issues. Nevertheless, what remains is a
blueprint for structuring future cases under the SPS Agreement.
I have argued that the factfinding approach being established for WTO
dispute settlement proceedings is fundamentally flawed in a number of
respects. Cases under the SPS Agreement implicate the momentous clash
between the interest in efficient international trade and the sovereign duty
to protect health. The WTO's structuring of the factfinding roles of its dis-
pute settlement bodies does not promise to be a stable institutional solu-
tion for resolving such disputes. What is needed is a dispute settlement
process organized so that a global consensus on the criteria for scientific
plausibility can evolve. Such a process would assist in the gradual replace-
ment of scientific uncertainty with scientific knowledge, but it would not
elevate one group of scientists over another or adopt particular science pol-
icies and impose them on individual members. 342 This Article proposes
338. Appellate Body Report, supra note 16, 246.
339. See id. 7 210-46.
340. Id. IN 108-09.
341. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.A.2, III.A.2.
342. In this Article, I have not developed the critical institutional perspective needed
to argue how the WTO can best achieve harmonization of sanitary measures under the
SPS Agreement. Nevertheless, the framework developed here sets the stage for such an
argument. A somewhat parallel situation occurred in a U.S. regulatory context in the
early 1980s, when the National Research Council was charged with studying the possi-
bility that a centralized scientific body was needed to conduct risk assessment for all
federal regulatory agencies engaged in risk-based regulation, so as to reduce the influ-
ence of policy-makers on risk assessment. See NRC (1994), supra note 24, at 33. The
NRC Committee rejected this proposal for various reasons, but recommended instead:
that a clear conceptual distinction should be maintained between risk assessment and
risk management, that the two activities should not be physically separated, and that
agencies should develop and use inference guidelines (default assumptions) that make
the role of science policy in risk assessment both principled and transparent. See id. at
33-34. A similar suggestion is possible in the WTO context. If WTO panels continue to
elucidate the distinct roles of risk assessment and risk management under the SPS
Agreement, and make findings concerning whether a science-policy option employed by
a member has a reasonable scientific basis, then the WTO dispute settlement process
will help create transparency in risk-based decision-making by members and will help
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an approach that would promote a gradual development of consensus
through the proper structuring of the WTO's factfinding process. By
adopting this proposed approach, the WTO may avoid becoming the
"World Trans-science Organization," an organization that would surely
pose a threat to sovereignty, and perhaps even to human health.
create an incentive for members to collaborate in areas of significant scientific uncer-
tainty. WTO panels should not establish science policies, but should identify reason-
able science policies that have been adopted by members and reward the adoption of
such policies by deferring to them.
